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June 14, 1984 Conference
List 3, Sheet 4
Petitioner to
nsideration.

No. 83-1961
LANDRETH TIMBER CO.

so Petition for Writ of
Certiorari

v.

LANDRETH, et al.
SUMMARY:

Petr requests that consideration of its petn for

cert (filed May 31, 1984) be expedited in order that the case
may be consolidated with Seagrove Corp v. Vista Resources, Inc.,
No. 83-1084 (cert. granted May 14, 1984) for argument in the
October Term.
BACKGROUND:

In Seagrove, the CA 2 held that the sale of

all the stock in a company wa s a securities transaction covered
by the federal securities laws.

The CA 2 recognized but

rejected the "economic reality" test used by several other
circuits to find that the sale of a business, including all its
stock, was not a securities transaction.

The Court granted cert

Petr seeks cert from the CA 9's opinion holding that the
sale of all the stock in a corporation was part of a sale-ofbusiness transaction and not covered by the federal securities
laws.

The petn for cert was filed on May 31, 1984.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the legal issue common to

both cases is presented in sharply different factual
situations.

Petr alleges that in Seagrove the stock purchasers

were sophisticated business persons.

The investors in Landreth

allegedly "acquired the shares of a company which was closely
held, located a continent away from the investors' homes, and
engaged in a business about which the investors had no
knowledge."
Petr suggests that the combination of Seagrove and its petn
presents the ideal setting for the resolution of an important
issue of federal law.

The different factual settings will

assist the Court in determining whether there should be a
sale-of-business or economic reality exception to the federal
securities laws.

However, expedition is necessary as Seagrove

has been tentatively set for argument early in the October 1984
Term.
Resps oppose expedition as well as the petn for cert.
Resps argue that petr has not expedited its proceedings.

The

CA 9's opinion issued on Mar. 7, 1984 but petr did not file its
petn until May 31, 1984.

Resp's second argument is that the

cases are not identical.

In Seagrove the purchasers assumed

complete control of management.
Resps indicate that they will file their opposition to the
petn on July 2, 1984.

But in case the Court does not wait for

-

j

-

their response, resps outlined their opposition.

Resps contend

that (a) in Seagrove the corporation was , publicly held whereas
in Landreth the corporation was a small family owned business;
(b) the principal purchaser in Landreth, a sophisticated
investor, conducted his own investigation but the purchasers in
Seagrove relied on public information available under the
securities laws; (c) in Landreth the sellers structured the sale
as the purchasers requested; and (d) in Landreth the purchasers
assumed immediate and complete control of the business.
Resps note that they intend to file an amici brief in
Seagrove noting the differences between the cases.
DISCUSSION:

Petr does present a case in which the CA 9

took a position contrary to the CA 2's decision in Seagrove.
The Court, however, was aware of the circuit conflict when it
granted cert in Seagrove.

Furthermore, the Court's grant of

cert in Seagrove may suggest that the legal issue transcends the
factual setting of the case.

In Seagrove the CA 2 had remanded

the case for the development of the facts.

If the Court thought

that the factual setting was critical, it might have delayed
review until the facts were determined.

Petr and resps may

alert the Court to the consequences of its decision in Seagrove
by filing amici briefs.
Resps' opposition raises some question as to whether the
issues raised by petr are certworthy.

The Court may want the

benefit of resps full response before considering the petn.

If

the petn raises only the issues raised in Seagrove, the Court
may wish to hold the petn for Seagrove.

If the petn raises

other certworthy issues, the Court might postpone the argument

date in Seagrove in order to allow the cases to be presented in
tandem.
CONCLUSION:

Although the CA 2 and the CA 9 have taken

different positions, it is not clear either t hat the courts were
presented with analogous cases or that this Court needs to take
cases from both circuits to resolve the legal issue.

Host of

the advantages of consolidation can be accomplished through
amici briefs and denial of the motion will allow the Court to
fully study this case before it grants cert.

If in October the

court determines that the cases should be heard together the
argument date for Seagrove can be postponed.

The motion may be

denied.
There is a response.
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Cert to CA9 {Browning, Tuttle,
Farris)

v.
LANDRETH,

et al.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil
that the CA erred in holding

tha ~h ~sale

of 100% of the

corporation is not a transac-

tion involving

meaning of the federal securi-

- ~

ties laws.
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Resps were the sole shareholders of
Landreth Timber Co. {Old Landreth), which owned a sawmill in Tonasket,

J.kLo

Fo~ ~o. 8'3-/0r~ ~utn've. ~f-

v.

lliflt\ Re,ov..-c_e_/
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\

Washington.

Resps decided to sell the mill.

Before a buyer could be

found, however, a fire destroyed a portion of the mill.

Resps then

set about rebuilding and refurbishing the mill to increase production.
While construction was underway, a small group of investors represented by Samuel Dennis expressed an intereit in buying the mill.
insisted upon a sale of

Resps

the t ~tock~ of Old Landreth rather than a sale
___.-J

of its assets.

Negotiations for the purchase culminated in an elabo-

rate stock purchase agreement.

The purchasers formed a Delaware cor-

poration, the B & D Company, which purchased the stock of Old
Landreth.

B & D and Old Landreth then merged to form petr Landreth

Timber Co.

(New Landreth).

out to be unprofitable.

Unfortunately, petr New Landreth turned

____________

It was..__forced to sell the mill
and
----. , . later went

into receivership.
Shortly therafter, petr brought suit in federal DC, seeking $2.5

~--~-------------------~
million in damages for violations
of the federa~- ~curities laws.
Petr claimed that resps had materially misrepresented the cost of the
mill's reconstruction, the condition of the existing machinery, and
the capacity of the mill when fully operative.

The DC granted summary

judgment for resps, holding that the Old Landreth stock was not a "security" within the meaning of the federal securities statutes.
CA9 affirmed, holding that the sale of 100% of the stock of a
closely held corporation is not a transaction involving a "security."
In so holding, the CA adopted the "sale of business" doctrine.

The

"sale of business" doctrine teaches that a purchaser of stock who assumes control of a company is not an investor expecting profits from
the efforts of othersi the stock purchased is therefore not a "security" under the securities acts.

The CA acknowledged the deep split

among the CAs on this issue, but aligned itself with the group of Circuits that favors an inquiry into the economic realities of the underlying transaction, rather than an evaluation of the characteristics of
the instrument involved, in deciding whether the federal securities
laws apply.

Applying the "sale of business" doctrine to the sale of

the stock in Old Landreth, the CA had no trouble in concluding that
the underlying transaction was the sale of a lumber business and
therefore not an investment in a "security."
CONTENTIONS: Petr is aware that the Court has recently granted
cert to determine the validity of the "sale of a business" doctrine in
Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., No. 83-1084 (cert. granted
May 14, 1984).

Petr asks that this petn be granted as well, because

it would be unfair to subject it to any rule other than that which
will be announced in Seagrave.

Petr also suggests that the factual

circumstances of this case might provide the Court with an interesting
contrast to those presented in Seagrave.

The balance of the petn is

devoted to an attack upon the merits of the "sale of a business" doctrine.
DISCUSSION: Petr is correct in asserting that this petn presents
precisely the issue raised in Seagrave: whether the purchase of all
the common stock of a corporation is a transaction in "securities" for
purposes of the federal securities laws.

While I think this is a

clear hold for Seagrave, I see no reason to grant this case and consolidate it with Seagrave for argument.

The arguments for and against

the "sale of business" doctrine seem to be developed adequately in
Seagrave, and I find nothing so extraordinary about the facts of this
case that it merits special attention.

The Court's disposition of

Seagrave will take care of this case as well.

I therefore recommend

CFR, with an eye toward a HOLD for Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources,
Inc., No. 83-1084.
I recommend CFR.
There is no response.
July 3, 1984

I

Hurley

Opn in petn
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Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum
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March 7, 1985
LANDRETH GINA-POW
MEMO TO:

LYNDA

FROM:

LFP, JR.

RE:

83-1961

Landreth Timber Co. v. Ivan Landreth
(CA9 - 100%)

84-165
note

I
these

above

Gould v. Ruefennache (CA3 - 50%)

that you are

the clerk assigned

cases.

experience

Your

at

to both of

Clary,

Gottlieb

should be helpful in your analysis.
In

Landreth

business was

the

sale

involved.

100%

In Gould

~eld
CI'l.J that

issue.

of

the

Securities Act applied.

of

the

stock

the sale of

50%

provisions

anti-fraud

,

I

of

CA9

a

is at
of

-

the

Chief

Judge Browning writing -

reached a different conclusion:

applying

to

what

has

come

business doctrine".

be

known

as

the

"sale

of

It concluded that the Securities Acts

were not applicable.
We

granted

authority

among

these

cases

seven

or

to resolve

eight

courts

split being about evenly divided.
briefs

strongly

transactions

supporting

involve

the

the
sale

a

wide

of

split of

appeal

-

the

The SG has filed amicus
view
of

that

both of

"stock",

one

of

these
the

express terms used

in the Acts of 33 and 34 to identify

covered securities, and therefore under the plain language
of these Acts - as well as their purpose - the anti-fraud
provisions

are applicable.

There

is no contention that

the registration provisions apply, as plainly they would
not as these were private sales involving relatively small
businesses.
As

had

I

statutes,

I

some

familiarity

confess to a

with

both

of

these

rather strong bias in favor of

CA9's position that one must look to the substance of the
transaction, rather than rely solely to the term "stock",
to conclude that the anti-fraud provision'S of these Acts
Although

apply.

the

SG

struggles

to

decison in United Housing Foundation v.

distinguish
Forman, I

my

am not

yet persuaded.
To

all

intense

purposes,

both

of

these

transactions involved - in effect - the transfer of assets
rather

than securities

in the normal sense of the term.

This is more obvious where 100% of the business was bought
than in the case where an individual purchased only 50% of
the stock.
that

I

But both cases involve types of transactions

doubt

anyone,

at

the

times

these

statutes

were

enacted,

would

have

believed

wj ere

covered

by

any

reason

to

provisions of these two federal laws.
These

are

fraud

cases,

and

there

is

no

believe that the state courts of California and New Jersey
would

not

have

plaintiffs

if

afforded
in

adqeuate
there

fact

protection

had

to

the

fraudulent

been

representations made that induced the purchase.
In the present cases the purchasers, in effect, were
buying

into

the

businesses

The

purchaser

in

the

New

Jersey, Gould, case bought 50% of the stock on condition
that

he could participate actively

aspects of management.
in

the

CA9

case

in certain

Of course,

took

over

important

the purchaser of 100%

complete

control

of

the

enterprise.
Having said all of this, Lynda, I concede that the SG
makes

strong

arguments.

I

have

not

read

decisions of the other courts of appeal.
your

own

expert

views,

summarized

any

of

the

Please give me

briefly

as

I

am

familiar generally with this area of the law.
I am, of course,
different

depending

interesteed in whether the rule is
on

extent

Landreth case simply is not a

.'

of

the

purchase.

The

"stock" purchase except in

the most technical
bought only 50%.

~ense.

Is Gould different because he

What if he had bought 25%?
LFP. JR •
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1 Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to
make clear here that these characteristics are those
usually associated with common stock, the kind of stock
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business.
Various types of preferred stock may have
different characteristics and still be covered by the
Acts.
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CHAMBERS OP

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 25, 1985

83-1961 - Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth

Dear Lewis,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.iuvrtm.t <!Jcurt of tqt 'Jnittb .ihdt.&'

Jlulfittgtcu, ~. OJ.

2ltc?J!,~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 25, 1985

No. 83-1961

Landreth Timber Company v.
Landreth

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

.jtqtrtme <!fourt of tqt ~tb .jtatts

'IJasJrittgtou. ~. <!f.

2.0,?J!.~

CHAMBERS Of'

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

April 25, 1985

No. 83-1961 - Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

;ftU .
T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iuprtutt Clfllnri ltf tfrt 'JitttUtb ~ta.tts
,ruJrin~ ~.

QJ.

2ll.;t'l-~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w.. . .J .

BRENNAN, .JR .

April 26, 1985

No. 83-1961
Landreth Timber Company
v . Landreth, et al.

Dear Lewis,
I agree.
Sincerely,

AJ
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

atomt

.hpuutt
of tltt 'Jlttitt~ .§htttg
...a:glfht:gbm. ~.
2llp~$

ar.

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 26, 1985

Re: No. 83-1961, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth
Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.jupretttt QI!tud ltf Urt ~uittb- ,jhdtg
Jfag4htghtu. Jl. QI. 2ll.;t~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 26, 1985

Re:

83-1961
84-165

Landreth v. Landreth
Gould v. Ruefenacht

Dear Lewis:
As I stated at Conference, after oral argument I
concluded that I would follow your lead in these
cases. I voted with you, and, having read your
opinions, must acknowledge that they are extremely
persuasive. I continue to be troubled, however, by a
rather firm conviction that Congress did not intend
the statutes to apply to transactions of this kind,
but rather was intending to deal with transactions in
publicly traded securities. Perhaps it's far too
late in the day to confine the statute to its
original purpose, but I'm sufficiently troubled by
the cases that I hope you will forgive me if I take a
few days to reflect before corning to rest.
I would
like to try to write out two or three paragraphs
summarizing my thoughts, but I have so many balls in
the air right now that I need a little time to sort
them out.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

,ju.prttttt

<!faun 11f tqt 'Jifui:ttb ,jtattg

-a:g!tittghm. ~. Qj:. 2ll~)!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 29, 1985

Re:

83-1961 - Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely ~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

,ju.vrttttt <!f~ttrl of t4t ~~ ,jtaftg
Jlagfringron. !Jl. <!f. 2llbf'!.;l
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May 6, 1985

THE cHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-1961 - Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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No. 83-1961
This

ca~

Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth
''t.:"8~

is here on writ of certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
question whether the sale of all of the

It presents the

stoc~ of a closely held

company~is a securities transaction subject to the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
The Court of Appeals applied the "sale of business"
doctrine.
the

It concluded; ihat in view of the economic realities of

transaction,/~

the securities laws did not apply.

The securities sol~were common stock.

They possessed

J

--

all of the customary characteristics of common stock.

As such,

they came expressly within the definition of a securityJ'in both

the~'f;;;-~~3-~~eurities

Pd:s.

1\

We therefore hold that under these circumstances,
reference to the economic realities of the transaction/ is
unnecessary to determine/ whether the securities laws apply.

~~~t~ecision
~

.

~

of the Court of Appeals fo.r the L-

~ nti1 Ci:ceui-t.

JUSTICE STEVENS has filed a dissenting opinion.

~

83-1961 Landreth Timber v. Landreth (Lynda)
LFP for
1st
2nd
3rd

the Court 4/1/85
draft 4/25/85
draft 5/2/85
draft 5/20/85
Joined by BRW 4/25/85
soc 4j25j85
TM '4/25/85
WJB 4/26/85
HAB 4/26/85
WHR 4/29/85
CJ 5/6/85
JPS dissenting
1st draft 5/15/85
2nd draft 5/16/85
3rd draft 5/20/85
2 copies to Mr. Lind 4/26/85

4 TilE WALL STREET JOURNAL WE{>NESDAY, MAY 29, 1985
.-,.

1/2

· Securities Law Applie5 Even in the Sale
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By STEPHEN WEKMIEL
St.Qff Reporter o/THE WALL 8Tllii:JCT JOURNAL

WASHINGTON- The Supreme Court
ruled that federal securities law applies
.
to the sale of stock in a closely held bust·
ness, even when the aim of the transaction
is the purchase of the business.
In two decisions, the high court refused
to recognize an exception to federal securities law for transactions In which 50% or
more of a closely held company's stock is
4 1it x9'/J 8ualnest Env.lope
sold.
The rulings settled a legal question that
ha,s sharply divided federal appeals courts
. throughout the country, as well as securil '
WITH 4 UNE IMPRINT
ties-law experts.
Appeals courts In Chicago, Denver, San
Premium QuaiHy
Francisco and Atlanta have ruled that
. 24ib. White Wove
when the purpose of a stock purchase Is
Stock
·
the acquisition of a closely held company,
Reg . $25.95
the transaction Is exempt from federal se·
1000 Enveiopt!ls for only $19.55 (Reg. $39.151
curities law. Under this "sale-of-business"
exemption, a buyer or seller couldn't sue
DSend me 500 Envelopes, ~em No. ER108 as shown
under the broad anti-fraud provisions of
above in 8loclc Ink . Enclosed Is $16.90 ($12 .95 plus
federal securities law.
$3.95 postage 8l handling).
D Send me 1000 Envelopes ~em No. ER10B.
Federal appeals courts in New York,
Enclosed is S24.50 ($19.55 plus $4.95 postage &.
Richmond, Va., Philadelphia, New Orleans
handling).
and St. Louis have said sale-of-business
Please check Typestyle 0 Format W 0 Format PG
Please Include CLEAR IMPRINT COPY
transactions aren't exempt from federal
on a separate u-t.
securities law.
NY and MD residents odd appropriate Soles tax.
The Supreme Court yesterday burled
0 Please send me your FREE 64 page color catalog.
the
sale-of-business doctrine. In 8-1 deciCHECK MUST ACCOMPANY COUPON
sions, both written by Justice Lewis Pow·
FOR THIS SPECIAL OfFER
ell, the high court said that as long as the
involved have the traditional
securities
F\>63
Name
characteristics of stock-the right to reCompany
ceive dividends, negotiability, voting rights
and the ability to appreciate In value-fedAddrMS
No P.O. Boxes. pleose
eral securities law applies, regardless of
City
the purpose of the transaction.
•
The high court rejected the suggestion
State
Zip
that securities law ·should apply only If a
lelepllona
buyer clearly Is making an Investment and
doesn't plan to be involved in running the
company.
Justice Powell acknowledged that the
1000 Florida Ave., *IJiralown, MD 21741
decision may create work for the federal
courts, but he said parties to a transaction
5 DAY SE AVICE
must know whether federal securities law
applies.
_ _ ___;__~.;-_ _..;;._ _ _ _ _-l
In one ruling, the high court reversed
the decision of a federal appeals court In
san Francisco, which threw out a securities-fraud lawsuit by a small group of Investors that bought all of the stock In Landreth rtmber Co., a sawmlll In Tonasket,
For complete
Wash. .The high court's rulln~ reinstates
bedtime comfort,
the lawsuit against the former owners.
select the finest ·
down pillows
In the other ease, the . Supreme Court
money can buy ·at
upheld a decision by a federal appeals
factory direct
court in Philadelphia. That decision
prices. Down filled
cleared the way for trial of a securitiespil~ confpnn to
fraud lawsuit by the buyer of 50% of the ·
the shape of the
stock In Continental Import &: Export Inc.,
hNd, producing
a wlne-and-~pirits Importer. . ·
luxuriously soft
Justice John Stevens dissented In both
support and
cases.
corre~ sleeping posture for the
The rulings suppoJ1 the position taken
shoulders. If you don't enjoy the best
by the Securities and Exchange Commts-·
night's sleep you've ever hlld, simply ·
slon in friend-of-the-court brief:!.
.•
return it to us for a complete refund.
Delivery: We !!hip within 24 to 48 hrs.
Rent Control '
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100~
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Improve the quality Of )'\Mlr We.
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Tne jUstices said'tbey w1ll review the lep.ltty of city rent-eontrol laws that ate
adopted Without· Jpectflc ·approval .from
state legislatures. A crouP of landlords appealed a nillng of the Callfornla Supreme
Court rejecting arguments that a rent-control law, approved In 1980 by voters In
Berkeley, violates ·federal antitrust law.
The landlords contend that rent .control
••
_,.
illegally restrains commerce and trade.
-- --and they asked the Supreme Court to rule
FIRM OOWN P LOWS ·
on that question.
110
.. Down190! Nall)pltGK COYII'I
l'he biglr court bas said tba1 cities are
~:ir~ ~".!6·
1: ~ ::mg ~ exempt from federal antitrust laws for proOKina- 20'" •l6"
,~ ltdail SUO OUR·PitiCE SZ51 grams that a}>l.noud• anti-competitiVe are
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1. . . . ORDER
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specifically authori%ed and supervised by ·
t~7Ext. HG9. ·
1 the state. In the Berkeley ease, the Su·
OM.C~
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IY~
preme Court also is being asked to decide
Ali:d.l
'
""'· Dt. _ _ ·whether the city is entitled to any exempoSend r:- . QlY .a·t · ~
1 Uon.
·
·
t eaw... -----. x s '
Tbe decision bl the case, probably next
Shlp.,~nce·SUo •· -s
spring, may have limited effect. Rent con·
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fected; . according to the National Multi
Housing Council, a trade association for
builders and developers of rental hous-
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. NEW YO
said Its help51 major t)".
last month, I
that "the un
a bit over the
· The boariJ
nonprofit ecd
said the lnde,·
the March r' ·
of this year
in April 19f
base of 100 ·

Ing. Lawyer Advertisfng
The high court ruled that the First
Amendment protects lawyers who use Illustrations and offer truthful legal advice
In newspaper and magazine advertising
that solicits clients.
The jtistlces said Ohio officials couldn't
legally reprimand a lawyer who Included a
"While ·
sketch of a Dalkon Shield intrauterine
overall pa
birth-control device In a newspaper ad that
stronger 1r
also advised women that they might be
the first c
able to sue the manufacturer If they were
stein, Jl t
injured by the device.
findings m
But the justices upheld the state's reprithat !abo
mand of the lawyer, Philip Zauderer of Coup."
lumbus, Ohio, for his failure to fully disAccor
close In the ad the possible costs of a lawbor Stat
suit against the manufacturer, A.H. Robins
ploymen
Co. The requirement that costs be dissame a:
closed, the court .said, protects the conappeals,
sumer.
The decision, which gives lawyers more 1982. In f
freedom to solicit clients through advertis- court, a ·
ing, was written by Justice Byron Wliite. peals c<
The court was unanimous on the use ,of Illustrations.
The
The ruling on legal advice was .5-3, with by Bert,
Justice Sandra O'Connor dissenting, joined
by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Jus- political
tice William Rehnquist. The decision on · cated col
Nov~
disclosure of costs was 6-2, with Justice ertHe
salc:i ·
William Brennan dissenting, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Powell a column t
named poll
didn't take part in the case.
man had
· Forro Precision
sion."
The justices refused to bear an appeal
The full
by Forro Precision Inc., a Los Angeles District of 1
area manufacturer of electronic data-pro- that the sta'
cessing equipment.
sued was t
A federal jury awarded Forro $2.7 ffiil- which is pn
lion In a lawsuit that accused International First Amer,
Business Machines Corp. of Interference and JustiCf.
, with prospective business; but a fed~ral should hear
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1984

IVAN K. LANDRETH, LUCILLE LANDRETH,
THOMAS E. LANDRETH, IVAN K. LANDRETH, JR.,
AND KATHLEEN LANDRETH, RESPONDENTS.

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF FACTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Respondents Ivan K. Landreth, Lucille Landreth, Thomas
E. Landreth, Ivan K. Landreth, Jr., and Kathleen Landreth
("Landreths'') respectfully move for clarification of certain
facts in this Court's May 28, 1985 opinion in the above captioned
matter.
II.

REASONS FOR REQUESTED CLARIFICATION

Respondents request that the Court add certain prefatory
comments to factual statements in the opinion so that it is clear
that these statements represent allegations of the petitioner,
~

rather than findings of fact by the district court below.

With

respect to each of these statements, no factual determination was
made by the district court.

The only issue decided by the dis-

trict court was whether the sale of respondents' sawmill business
was the sale of a security under the federal securities acts.
The issue was determined on summary judgment.

Motion for Clarification
of Facts - 1

No factual deter-

minations were made on petitioner's claims of fraud and misrepresentation.

Furthermore, these allegations are vigorously con-

tested by respondents.

Thus, various factual statements in this

Court's opinion represent allegations of the parties, not findings of fact.
III.

REQUESTED CLARIFICATION

The clarification requested by respondents can be
accomplished in several ways.
First, clarification of all facts may be made by a
general applicable revision such as adding the statement by
footnote:

"Factual statements herein represent allegations of

the parties, construed most favorably for petitioner as the nonmoving party on summary judgment.

The Court recognizes that many

of these facts are contested by respondents."
Second, the Court can add the phrase "petitioner alleges
the following facts" at the outset of various factual recitations
found in the opinion at Page 1, line 5; Page 2, line 11; and Page
14, line 4.
Third, if the Court rejects the first two alternatives,

____________.

at the very least the Court should clarify the following statements so it is clear that these represent allegations of petitioner rather than findings of fact:
l.

PAGE l, LINE 7:

The Landreth family offered their stock for sale
through both Washington and out-of-state brokers.
. . . Despite the fire, the broker continued to offer
the stock for sale.
(Emphasis added).
Respondents offered their "business" for sale.

1~
I

to a stock sale.

V

Landreth Timber Company listing, C.R. 93).

Motion for Clarification
of Facts - 2

(See

The

2.

PAGE 1, LINE 14:

Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney,
received a letter offering the stock for sale. On the
basis of the letter's representations . . . Dennis
became interested in acquiring the stock.
In fact, the letter offered a sawmill for sale and did
not mention stock.

(J.A. 96-100).

Also respondents will present

evidence at trial establishing that Dennis relied on the advice
of experts retained by him, not alleged statements of respondents
in deciding to purchase the mill.

Respondents accordingly

request that this statement be revised to include the language
"Petitioner alleges that Samuel Dennis
3.

II

PAGE 2, LINE 11:

After the acquisition was completed, the mill did
not live up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding
costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components
turned out to be incompatible with existing equipment.
These allegations were not addressed on the merits by
the district court below and are disputed by respondents.
of Respondents at 2 n.5).

(Brief

These issues relate to petitioner's

allegations of fraud and misrepresentation which are not properly
before this Court and remain to be resolved at trial.
ingly, this statement should be modified to read:

Accord-

"Petitioner

alleges that after the acquisition was completed • .

Rebuild-

ing costs, as alleged by petitioner, exceeded earlier estimates
II

4.

PAGE 14, LINE 2:

We think even that assertion is open to some question,
however, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill themselves.
Ivan Landreth apparently
stayed on to manage the daily affairs of the business.
Petitioner admits that Ivan Landreth did not stay on to
manage the daily affairs of the business.

Rather, Phil Cook, the

new manager retained by petitioner before closing, was placed in

Motion for Clarification
of Facts - 3

charge of the mill.

After closing, Landreth was merely a consul-

tant, terminable without cause upon 30 days notice.
88, 190-98, 297-99).

(J.A. 186-

The admitted facts also establish that

Dennis and Bolten became officers and directors of Landreth
Timber Company.

(J.A. 186).

To the extent that petitioner

alleges continuing fraud and mismanagement in reconstruction of
the sawmill, the trial court below must determine whether Dennis,
Bolten, Cook, or Landreth were responsible for mill operations
and reconstruction after closing of the sale.

Consequently,

these statements should be revised as follows:
We think even that assertion is open to some question,
however, as petitioner alleges that Dennis and Bolten
had no intention of running the sawmill themselves.
Petitioner also alleges that Ivan Landreth stayed on to
manage the daily affairs of the business.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons previously set forth, respondent's
motion for Clarification of Facts should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this
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LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

stock's usual characteristics as identified in Forman, supra, a purchaser
justifiably may assume that the federal securities laws apply. The stock
involved here possesses all of the characteristics traditionally associated
with common stock. Moreover, reading the securities laws to apply to
the sale of stock at issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose
in enacting the legislation to protect investors. Pp. 3-6.
(b) When an instrument is labeled "stock" and possesses all of the traditional characteristics of stock, a court is not required to look to the
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the stock is
a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. A contrary rule is not supported by this Court's prior decisions involving unusual instruments not
easily characterized as "securities." Nor were the Acts intended, as
asserted by respondents, to cover only "passive investors" and not privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of control to "entrepreneurs." Pp. 6-11.
(c) An instrument bearing both the name and all of the usual characteristics of stock presents the clearest case for coverage by the plain
language of the definition. "Stock" is distinguishable from most if not
all of the other listed categories, and may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the Acts' definition of "security." Pp. 11-12.
(d) Application of the "sale of business" doctrine depends on whether
control has passed to the purchaser. Even though the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control, the purchasers here
had no intention of running the sawmill themselves. Moreover, if the
doctrine were applied here, it would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold, thus inevitably leading to difficult questions of line-drawing. As explained in Gould v.
Ruefenacht, post, p. - - , coverage by the Acts would in most cases be
unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold.
Such uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intolerable. Pp. 12-14.
731 F. 2d 1348, reversed,

II

MEMORANDUM T
From:

JUSTICE POWELL

Lynda
Re:
No. 83-1961 Landr th Timber Co. v. Landreth
in Our Opinion
Motion of Respondents to
Attached is a motion

respondents requesting the

Court to clarify the facts in ou

-------=-------

Respondents wish us to make

decision in this case.

clear~hat

the facts as we state them

are simply alleged by petrs: because the case comes up on a
motion for summary judgment, no factual rulings have been made by

It is true that our opinion does not specify that the
facts are as alleged by petrs.

However, nowhere do we state that

they were so found by the DC, and we do note on p. 2 that the

-----------..._

case came up on a motion for summary judgment.

I am inclined to

~

think the motion should be denied.

If you wish to consider it

further, Mr. Stevas has offered to call for a response from
petrs.

f.1L

tp/zt!)
~ ~AL-(_ ~

~4-1-4~~~

~

rf4R .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON. D . C . 20543

June 14, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE POWELL

!/)

FROM:

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS

RE:

Case No. 83-1961, Landreth Timber v. Landreth
In the above case wherein you authored the opinion which

was released on May 28, 1985, I have received the attached motion
from counsel for respondents.

I do not believe this is a motion

which should be directed to the full Court and indeed you may
wish to deny it or ignore it.
Alternatively,

you may wish to defer awaiting a response

from petitioners or you may wish to direct me to call upon
petitioners for a response.

____

I have not caused the

filed ....pending further instructions from you .

Attachment

to be

lgd June 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Re:

Lynda
No. 83-1961

Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth

I checked the appendix and read the letter received by
Samuel Dennis.

In fact, it does not mention the stock, so to be

perfectly accurate, we should change the first sentence of the
second paragraph in Part I to read:

"Samuel Dennis, a

Massachusetts tax attorney, received a letter offering the
~siness

for sale."

It is, however, accurate to say, as we do in

the first paragraph, that "[t)he Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both washington and out-of-state brokers."
In light of what we have discussed about the fact that
the opinion makes clear the case is here on summary judgment, I
am not sure that it will make much difference whether we make
this change.
more accurate.

Making the change would, however, make the opinion

June 24, 1985
83-1961 Landreth Timber Co. et al v. Landreth, et al.
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Counsel for respondents has filed a "motion for
clarification of facts" that the Clerk referred to me.
Counsel for petitioners have advised the Clerk that they
will make no response.
The substance of the motion i.s that we make it
explicj.tly clear that our statement of facts represents allegations of petitioners rather than findinqs of fact by the
District Court, and that we refer to the fact that sale of
the "business" as well as sale of the stock was mentioned.
We d i.d say that respondents "moved for summary
judgment", and that the DC granted the motion and dismissed
the complaint for want of fef!eral jurisdiction. Sllp opinion, o. 2. Nevertheless, I am willing to add at the very
beginning of Part I the following:
"The facts, as alleged by Petitioners, are as
follows:"
In addition, I am clarifying the first sentence in
the second paragraph on p. 1 to read as follows:
"Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax
attorney, received a letter offering the
business for sale".
In the preceding paragraph, we accurately stated
that the family offered their stock for sale through both
Washington and out-of-stAte brokers, and - of course - the
deal as neqotiated was only for the sale of stock.
Absent objection, the foregoing will be added, and
Henry Lind and the Clerk will be so advised.

r... F.P., Jr.
ss

--------------·
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens
rflr-'Y 15 !985

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1961

LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
IVAN K. LANDRETH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In my opinion, Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to every transaction in a security described in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act: 1
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, ... investment contract, voting-trust certificate, ... or in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security."' 15 U. S. C. § 77b(l).
See also n. 1, ante.
Congress presumably adopted this sweeping definition "to
prevent the financial community from evading regulation by
inventing new types of financial instruments rather than to
prevent the courts from interpreting the Act in light of its
purposes." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 201 (CA7 1982).
Moreover, the "broad statutory definition is preceded ... by
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context otherwise requires . . . . '
'Cf. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc ., 457 F.2d 274, 275-~76 (CA7)
J., for the court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) ("we do not
believe every conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary definition of an investment contract was intended to be included within the statutory definition of a security").
(STEVENS,

83-1961-DISSENT
2

LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

"Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982).
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts
makes clear that Congress was primarily concerned with
transactions in securities that are traded in a public market.
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S.
837 (1975), the Court observed:
"The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was
to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital
market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to
raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges
on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and protect the interest of investors. Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto."
Id., at 849.
I believe that Congress wanted to protect investors who do
not have access to inside information and who are not in a
position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining appropriate contractual warranties.
At some level of analysis, the policy of Congress must provide the basis for placing limits on the scope of the Securities
Acts. The economic realities of a transaction may determine
whether "unusual instruments" fall within the scope of the
Act, ante, at 8, and whether an ordinary commercial "note" is
covered, id., at 10-11. The negotiation of an individual
mortgage note, for example, surely would not be covered by
the Act, although a note is literally a "security" under the
definition. Cf. Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
726 F. 2d 930, 937 (CA2), cert. denied, U.S. (1984). The marketing of a large portfolio of mortgage
loans, however, might well be. See Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 463 F. 2d 1075, 1079-1080 (CA7), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 1009 (1972).

83-1961-DISSENT
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH
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I believe that the characteristics of the entire transaction
are as relevant in determining whether a transaction in
"stock" is covered by the Act as they are in transactions
involving "notes," "investment contracts," or the more
hybrid securities. Providing regulations for the trading of
publicly listed stock-whether on an exchange or in the overthe-counter market-was the heart of Congress' legislative
program, and even private sales of such securities are surely
covered by the Acts. I am not persuaded, however, that
Congress intended to cover negotiated transactions involving
the sale of control of a business whose securities have never
been offered or sold in any public market. In the latter
cases, it is only a matter of interest to the parties whether
the transaction takes the form of a sale of stock or a sale of
assets, and the decision usually hinges on matters that are irrelevant to the federal securities laws such as tax liabilities,
the assignability of Government licenses or other intangible
assets, and the allocation of the accrued or unknown liabilities of the going concern. If Congress had intended to provide a remedy for every fraud in the sale of a going concern
or its assets, it would not have permitted the parties to bargain over the availability of federal jurisdiction.
In short, I would hold that the antifraud rovisions of the
federal securities laws are inapplicable unless the transaction
involves (i) the sale of a s;;;rity t'liat ~ded in a p~lic
market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a osition to negotiate
~appropriate contractual warranties ana to insist on access to
inSi e I orma~matmg t e transaction . Of
course,liiitir tl1e precise contours 0 such a standard could be
marked out in a series of litigated proceedings, some uncertainty in the coverage of the statute would be unavoidable.
Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the interests in certainty
and predictability that are associated with a simple "brightline" rule are not strong enough to "justify expanding liability
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to reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legislature's concern." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d, at 202.
Both of these cases involved a sale of stock in a closely-held
corporation. In each case the transaction was preceded by
comprehensive negotiations between the buyer and seller.
There is no suggestion that the buyers were unable to obtain
appropriate warranties or to insist on the exchange and independent evaluation of relevant financial information before
entering into the transaction. 2 I do not believe Congress
intended that the federal securities laws govern the private
sale of a 'substantial ownershi interest 'in these operating
businesses simply because the transactions were structured
as sales of stock instead of assets.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No.
83-1961 and reverse the judgment in No. 84-165.

2

Indeed, in No. 83-1961, the parties entered into a lengthy Stock Purchase Agreement containing extensive warranties and other protections
for the purchasers. App. 206-263.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumbe.r company.
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t
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company
stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 7ea et seq.
(the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority'' of courts that had held that the federal securities
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security'' unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affinned the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C.
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
lmown as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
1

We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in§ 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Hausing
Foundation, Inc. v. Fcmnan, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975).
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of
the kind of context to which the Acts normally appl;y-. It is
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en1
Although we did not so specify in ForrruJ,n, we wish to make clear here
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock,
the kind of stock ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and
still be covered by the Acts.
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security.'" SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad defuPtion
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here
falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
• Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security'' if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were ''investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
''investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their

83-1961-0PINION

8

LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character:..
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been
4
Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their argument that we have mandated in every case a detennination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of
deposit, for a security."
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security'' simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." I d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality
test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an ''investment contract," not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Team'In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it detennines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551,
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting
Formo,n, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as
respondents do. We made the statement in Formo,n in reference to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated,
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sters v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the
Howey test to "detennine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the
statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of
Golden v.
many types of instruments superfluous.
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the.. transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. '§ 77d(2),
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were ''investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "security."'" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security."' Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6
B
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock ''represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditiOI·lal stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an ''investment contract" to tradi• In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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tiona! stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. ,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. A.s we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Goverrwrs, 468 U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at - - . We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed to
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Lawsf"W7,...~7:;----')
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District cb\u-t
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at - - , decided
today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9
(rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue

•
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there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security"
once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal
courts by converting state and common law fraud claims into
federal claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction may never know whether
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended
discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the
passage of control. Accord, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d')
1145-1146.

v

In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In my opinion, Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to every transaction in a security described in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act: 1
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, . . . investment contract, voting-trust certificate, . . . or in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security."' 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1).
See also n. 1, ante.
'Cf. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275-276 (CA7)
(STEVENS, J., for the court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) ("we do not

believe every conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary definition of an investment contract was intended to be included within the statutory definition of a security'').
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Congress presumably adopted this sweeping definition "to
prevent the financial community from evading regulation by
inventing new types of financial instruments rather than to
prevent the courts from interpreting the Act in light of its
purposes." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 201 (CA7 1982).
Moreover, the "broad statutory definition is preceded ... by
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context otherwise requires . . . . '"
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982). '
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts
makes clear that Congress was primarily concerned with
transactions in securities that are traded in a public market.
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S.
837 (1975), the Court observed:
"The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was
to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital
market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to
raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges
on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and protect the interest of investors. Congress intended the application of these
statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto."
Id., at 849.
I believe that Congress wanted to protect investors who do
not have access to inside information and who are not in a
position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining appropriate contractual warranties.
At some level of analysis, the policy of Congress must provide the basis for placing limits on the coverage of the Securities Acts. The economic realities of a transaction may determine whether "unusual instruments" fall within the scope of
the Act, ante, at 8, and whether an ordinary commercial
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"note" is covered, id. , at 10-11. The negotiation of an individual mortgage note, for example, surely would not be covered by the Act, although a note is literally a "security"
under the definition. Cf. Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F. 2d 930, 937 (CA2), cert. denied,- U. S.
- - (1984). The marketing to the public of a large portfolio
of mortgage loans, however, might well be. See Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 463 F. 2d 1075, 1079-1080 (CA7), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. ·1009 (1972).
I believe that the characteristics of the entire transaction
are as relevant in determining whether a transaction in
"stock" is covered by the Act as they are in transactions involving "notes," "investment contracts," or the more hybrid
securities. Providing regulations for the trading of publicly
listed stock-whether on an exchange or in the over-thecounter market-was .the heart of Congress' legislative program, and even private sales of such securities are surely
covered by the Acts. I am not persuaded, however, that
Congress intended to cover negotiated transactions involving
the sale of control of a business whose securities have never
been offered or sold in any public market. In the latter
cases, it is only a matter of interest to th~ parties whether
the transaction takes the form of a sale of stock or a sale of
assets, and the decision usually hinges on matters that are irrelevant to the federal securities laws such as tax liabilities,
the assignability of Government licenses or other intangible
assets, and the allocation of the accrued or unknown liabilities of the going concern. If Congress had intended to provide a remedy for every fraud in the sale of a going concern
or its assets, it would not have permitted the parties to bargain over the availability of federal jurisdiction.
In short, I would hold that the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws are inapplicable unless the transaction
involves (i) the sale of a security that is traded in a public
market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negotiate
appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to
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inside information before consummating the transaction. Of
course, until the precise contours of such a standard could be
marked out in a series of litigated proceedings, some uncertainty in the coverage of the statute would be unavoidable.
Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the interests in certainty
and predictability that are associated with a simple "brightline" rule are not strong enough to "justify expanding liability
to reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legislature's concern." 2 · Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d, at 202. •
Both of these cases involved a sale of stock in a closely-held
corporation. In each case the transaction was preceded by
comprehensive negotiations between the buyer and seller.
There is no suggestion that the buyers were unable to obtain
appropriate warranties or to insist on the exchange and independent evaluation of relevant financial information before
entering into the transactions. 3 I do not believe Congress
intended the federal securities laws to govern the private
sale of a substantial ownership interest in these operating
businesses simply because the transactions were structured
as sales of stock instead of assets.
In final analysis, the Court relies on its own evaluation of the relevant
"policy considerations." See ante, at 12-15 and especially n. 7. While I
agree that policy considerations are relevant in construing the Securities
Acts, I would prefer to rely principally on the policies of Congress as reflected in the legislative history. If extrinsic considerations are to be
given effect, I would place a far different evaluation on the weight of the
conflicting policies, largely because I strongly believe that this Court
should presume that federal legislation is not intended to displace state authority unless Congress has plainly indicated an intent to do so. See e. g.,
Bennett v. New Jersey, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 16 (1985) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting); Garcia v. United States, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, - - U.S. - - , - - (1983)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting); United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d 310, 316
(CA7 1971) (STEVENS, J., for the court) Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 477 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
3
Indeed, in No. 83-1961, the parties entered into a lengthy Stock Purchase Agreement containing extensive warranties and other protections
for the purchasers. App. 206-263.
2
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I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
No. 83-1961 and reverse the judgment in No. 84-165.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case presents the question whether the sale of all
of

the

stock

of

a

company

is

a

securities

transaction

2.

subject

to

the

antifraud

provisions

of

the

federal

securities laws (the Acts).

I

This action arises out of the sale by respondents Ivan
K.

Landreth and his sons of all of the outstanding stock

of

a

closely

operated

in

held

lumber

Tonasket,

out-of-state

~efore

broker i:.

the

Despite
stock

for

the

-

fire,

sale,

owned

Landreth

and

family

sale through both Washington and

company's
fire.

The

Washington.

offered their stock for

they

business

a

purchaser

sawmill

was

heavily

was

found ~

damaged

by

the brokers continued to offer

a.~

riif>ort ,i ng

t tfat

completely rebuilt and modernized.

the

mill

would

be

3.

Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter

offering

the

stock

for

sale

and

making

certain

a4..J..e,

representations abotlt the extent of the rebuilding plans,
the

productivity

predicted

contracts,

and

expected

mill,

the

of

Dennis

profits •

existing

was

interested

..f.~ ,Lo

and contaoted John Bolten, a former client who had retired
to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After

having

conducted,

an

Dennis

audit
agreed

and

an

to

inspection

purchase

all

of
of

the
the

mill

common

stock in the lumber company,

and Ivan Landreth agreed to

stay on as

some

a

consultant for

daily operations of the mill.

time to help with

the

Dennis assigned the stock

to B & D Company, a company formed for the sole purpose of
acquiring

the

with

lumber

the

lumber

company

company,

stock.

forming

B

&

D then merged

petitioner

Landreth

4.

Company.

Timber

petitioner's

Dennis

Class

A

and

owned

Bolten

stock,

representing

all

of

of

the

85%

equity, and six other investors together owned the Class B
stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed,

the mill did not

live up to the purchasers' expectations.

Rebuilding costs

exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out
to be

Eventually,

incompatible with existing equipment.
~~.a_~

petitioner

sold

the

mill

A

and

went

into

receivership.

Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the
sale

of

stock

and

$2,500,000

in damages,

alleging

that

respondents had widely offered and then sold their stock
without registering it as required by the Securities Act
of

1933,

15

u.s.c.

§77a,

et

seq.,

(the

1933

Act).

Petitioners also alleged that respondents had negligently

5.

.?
a.-c.J.
or intentionally made misrepresentations or had failed to
~1-o

state material facts

~~
in

lumber

compa~
~·~~~~c~o~nmt~Ieeec~t~i~o~n~r-~
~~~l~·~~h
~~
tbbaa--••~t~o~c~k~~s~a~l~e,~

violation

u.s.c.

the worth and prospects of the

~t

of

the

Securities

§78a, et seq.

Respondents

Exchange

Act

of

1934,

15

(the 1934 Act).

moved

for

summary

judgment on

the ground

that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under

the

petitioner
meaning

.. sale

so-called
had

of

respondents'

not

those

purchased
Acts.

include

constituting
possessed

a

"security"
District

doctrine,
within

Court

the

granted

motion and dismissed the complaint for want

of federal jurisdiction.
statutes

The

business ..

of

a

all

It acknowledged that the federal

"stock"

.. security, ..
of

the

as

one

and

that

of
the

characteristics

the

instruments

stock
of

at

issue

conventional

6.

stock.

Nonetheless,

it

"growing

majority"

courts

of

joined

what

that

it

had

termed

held

that

the
the

federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100%
of

the

13a.

u.s.

stock

of

a closely held corporation.

Petn App.

Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421
837

~

(1946),

"security"

hands of

with

from

managerial

u.s.

293

that the stock could not be considered a

unless

transaction

Howey Co., 328

ffi--,.1-.Je-...J-

~~ ruled

derived

w.J.

(1975), and SEC v.

the

the
the

purchaser
anticipation

efforts

control of

had

the

the purchasers,

of

entered

of

earning

others.

business
and thus,

had

into

profits

Finding
passed

the

into

that
the

that the transaction

was a commercial venture rather than a typical investment,
the District Court dismissed the complaint.

7.

The

United

States

Circuit affirmed

Court

and

whether

Howey,

the

~a use

economic

the

for

the

Ninth

It agreed that it was bound by

supra,

indicated that the Acts

~4/

Appeals

the District Court's application of the

sale of business doctrine.
Forman

of

Courts

to

determine

realities

in
the

of

every

case

transaction

applied~

of

Appeals

are

S!e T

Y..sl.y

divided

over the applicability of the federal securities laws when
a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its stock,
we

granted

u.s.

certiorari.

(1984).

We

now

reverse.
II
It

is

axiomatic

that

"[t]he

starting

point

in every

case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself."

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421

u.s.

8.

723,

756

(1975)

(POWELL,

J. ,

concurring);

accord

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
551,

558

(1979).

Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15

u.s.

u.s.c.

§77b(l), defines a "security" as including
"any
note,
stock,
treasury
stock,
bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization
certificate
or
subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 1 security, 1 or any certificate of
interest or
participation
in,
temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to ~ubscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing."
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite

1 we have
repeatedly
ruled
that
the definitions of
"security" in §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act and §2(1) of the
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as
such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982);
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 847
n.l2 (1975).

9.

broad, Marine Bank v.
and

includes

well-settled

both

455

instruments

meaning,

variable character

weaver,

as

well

[that]

as

names

u.s.

of the definition shows that

instruments

8

United

Housing

(1982),

of

carry
nmore

investment contractu and

8

SEC v.

344, 351 (1943).

c.

M.

The face

Stockn is considered to be a

Securityn within the meaning of the

in

556
alone

instrument commonly known as a 'security.•n

Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

8

whose

551,

were necessarily designated by

more descriptive terms,u such as
8

u.s.

Foundation

v.

O:t A

n s we observed

Forman,

421

u.s.

837

(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title
are likely to be covered by the definition.
As we also recognized

in Forman,

that instruments bear the label

8

Id., at 850.

h~ the

fact

Stockn is not of itself

sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts.

Rather, we

10.

concluded

that

instruments

we

must

possess

also

determine

"some

of

whether

the

those

significant

characteristics typically associated with" stock, id., at
851,

recognizing

"stock"

and

purchaser

that when an instrument is both called

bears

stock's

justifiably

usual

[may]

characteristics,

assume

securities laws apply," id., at 850.

that

the

federal

We identified those

character is tics usually associated with stock as
right

to

receive

apportionment

of

dividends

profits;

(ii)

contingent
negotiability;

ability to be pledged or hypothecated;

"a

( i)

the

upon

an

(iii)

the

(iv) the ability to

confer voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned; and (v} the capacity to appreciate in value.
Under

the

instruments

at

facts
issue

of

Forman,

we

there were not

concluded

that

Id.
the

"securities" within

11.

the meaning of the Acts.
shares

of

stock

That case involved the sale of

entitling

the

purchaser

apartment in a housing cooperative.
of

the

characteristics

listed

lease

an

The stock bore none

above

associated with traditional stock.

to

that

are

usually

Moreover, we concluded

that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that
the purchasers had been misled by use of the word "stock"
into

thinking

that

their purchases.

the

federal

securities

laws governed

The purchasers had intended to acquire

low-cost subsidized living space for

their personal use;

no one was likely to have believed
were purchasing investment securities.
In contrast,

Id., at 851.

it is undisputed that the stock involved

here possesses all of the characteristics we identified in
Forman

as

traditionally

associated

with

stock.

Indeed,

12.

Petn App.

the District Court so found.
unlike in Forman,
here--the

13a.

Moreover,

the context of the transaction involved

sale of

stock

in a corporation--is typical of

the context to which the Acts normally apply.
much

more

likely

would

believe

he

laws.

Under

the

meaning

of

the

here
was

than

in

covered

statutory

Forman

that

the

federal

by

circumstances

It is thus

of

this

definition

an

investor

securities

case,

the

mandates

plain

that

the

stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage
of the Acts.
Reading
stock

at

purpose
by

the

securities

issue

here

in enacting

"compelling

issuance of

full

'the

laws

comports

to apply
with

to

the

Congress's

sale of
remedial

the legislation to protect investors
and

many

fair

disclosure relative to the

types of

instruments

that

in our

13.

commercial

world

security."

SEC

(1946)
(1933))

fall
v.

within

W.J.

the ordinary concept of

Howey

Co.,

328

U.S.

293,

a

299

(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11

0

Although

we

recognize

that

intend to provide a broad federal
Marine Bank v. weaver, 455

u.s.

Congress

remedy for

did

not

all fraud,

551, 556 (1982), we think

it would improperly narrow Congress's broad definition of
"security"

to

hold

that

the

traditional

stock

at

issue

here falls outside the Acts' coverage.
III

Under

other

circumstances,

we

might

consider

the

astatutory analysis outlined above to be sufficient answer
A

.
compe 11 1ng

. d gment
JU

f or

2
.
pet1. t1oners.

Respondents urge,

2 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is
sufficient.
L.
Loss,
Fundamentals
of
Securities
Footnote continued on next page.

14.

however, that language in our previous opinions, including
Forman, requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and
the

characteristics

of

the

instruments

involved

to

determine whether application of the Acts is mandated by
the economic substance of the transaction.

Moreover, the

Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning
of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock
covered,

because

it

treating

notes,

bonds,

and

differently.

We

categories

saw

"no principled
other
address

of

way"
the

these

to

justify

definitional
concerns

in

turn.
A

Regulation

212

•s

s a_

~eeeeRtially

furtbe x:_

a~ ~-")

27 28. - -

a
as
1o
(emphasis in ot :i:giual),

15.

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely
clear
when

on

the

an

decided

proper

instrument
a

number

method
is

of

of

a

analysis

for

"security."

cases

in

which

determining

This
it

Co.urt

looked

to

has
the

economic substance of the transaction, rather than just to
its form,
v.

C.M.

to determine whether the Acts applied.
Joiner

Leasing Corp.,

320

u.s.

344

In SEC

(1943),

for

example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied

a-to the sale of leasehold interests in land nea 51 proposed
oil

well

drilling.

interests

were

reach

the

of

commonplace."

In

holding

"securities,"
Act

does

Rather,

not

that

the

Court

stop

with

the
noted
the

leasehold
that

obvious

"the
and

it ruled that unusual devices such

as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt

16.

in

under

terms

or

courses

of

dealing

their character in commerce as
as

'any

interest

'security.'"
SEC v.

or

which

established

'investment contracts,' or

instrument

commonly

known

as

a

Id., at 351.

W.J.

Howey Co.,

328 U.S.

293

(1946),

further

elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual
instrument

could

be

considered

a

"security"

circumstances of the transaction so dictated.
that

case

was

an

offering

of

units

development coupled with

a contract

marketing

remitting

investors.
an
Act

the

fruit

The Court

and

~~
r~l~d

"investment contract"
because,

looking

at

of
for

the

a

if

the

At issue in
citrus

grove

cultivating and
proceeds

to

the

that the offering constituted

within
the

the meaning of the 1933
economic

realities,

the

transaction "involve[d] an investment of money in a common

17.

enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."
This
second

Id., at 301.
so-called

"Howey

part

our

of

test"

formed

decision

in

respondents primarily rely.
II,

supra,

the

first

the basis for
Forman,

on

the

which

As discussed above, see Part

part

of

our

decision

in

Forman

concluded that the instruments at issue, while they bore
the

traditional

label

"stock,"

were

not

"securities"

because they possessed none of the usual character is tics
of stock.

We then went on to address the argument that

the instruments were "investment contracts."
Howey

test,

we

concluded

that

the

Applying the

instruments

w9r 7

~

likewise not

"securities" by virtue of being "investment

'\.
contracts"

because

transaction

showed

the
that

economic
the

realities

purchasers

had

of

the

parted with

18.

their money not for

~:

~9
~~
~

the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a

.

··~~
~~

~

;Jk.
tf.-

7 'fw
commodity for personal consumption.

421

u.s.,

at 858.

Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it

was

require

us

to

the

reject

~
pQssisi~~

~

~

the purpose of reaping profits from

considered

that the shares of stock at issue here may be

"

"securities"

because

of

their

name

and

£rw'

~~--3 Respondents also
.

rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
332 (1967), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551
(1982), as support for their argument that we have
mandated in every case a determination of whether the
economic
realities
of
a
transaction
call
for
the
application of the Acts.
It is sufficient t0~ Y~ to note
here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did
not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific
kinds of securities listed in the definition. See pp. 1923,
infra.
Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver
involved
a
certificate of deposit and
a
privately
negotiated profit sharing agreement. See 455 u.s. 551, at
557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of
deposit
involved
in Weaver did not fit within the
definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a
security."

u.s.

19.

characteristics.

Instead,

they

argue

that

our

cases

require

in every case to the economic substance

of the transaction to determine whether the Howey test has
been

According

met.

to

respondents,

it

is

clear

that

petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of
others,
control.

but

to buy a

Petitioner

company
was

not

that
a

it could

passive

manage

investor

of

and
the

kind Congress intended the Acts to protect, but an active
entrepreneur, who sought to "use or consume" the business
purchased just as the purchasers in Forman
the

apartments

stock.
~ ,~ ~

We

they acquired after

so~ght

purchasing

to use

shares of

Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
disagree

with

respondents'

interpretation

of

our

8~j~j
~~~ H~~
1/J.-

,. cases.

First, it is important to understand the contexts

~?-t••d ...t.-~~J,..i'_

,l"-<.,j~/...e.~

within which these cases were decided.

All of the cases

20.

on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not
easily characterized as

"securities."
a~

were to apply in those cases
because

been

the

economic

Thus,

if the Acts

all, it would have to have
underlying

reality

the

transaction indicated that the instrument was actually of

~t
a

type \that

ftU..ts c.Ot. ~ -Ule ~ ~ ..c1 C).)
"ifi oar eommer:cial -.iorld fall [s] witl=lin tl=le

~~ncept
_c on~ . ,

1st

~ecurit:y"

of

a

11

Sess.

Rep ,

security "
( 1 9~3)

is quite broad,

~h~

and as

Act:s'

th~

85,

No.

13a

Jefini Lion

of

Howey Court noted,

.Congress intended iH the Acts to adopt a "flexible r ather
"than

a

-..f nl fill
"El:i

stat1c pr1nc1ple."
CoH9ress 's

sclosu:re

· Bank: v.
felt

to

purpose

protect

weaver,

eoftstrain~J

328

the

of

u.s.,

at 293.

promoting

inves Ling

455

u.s.

551 ,

556

in

the

case

of

fnll

publ io,

(1982),
unusua l

In order: to
and
see

:fa-i l'-

Marine

th1s Cou r t
iHse:rum~nts

ha s - to

21.

]:.Qok --deeper-to i:he-eeonomic subs lance to-de-te-r-mi-ne whether

-the P..ct-s -governed.

In the case at bar,

instrument involved

is traditional stock,

the statutory
was

definition. ~ere

in the prior cases,

in contrast, the
plainly within

is no need here, as there

to look beyond the

instrument to determine whether the Acts
Contrary

to

respondents'

implication,

~~

characte ~

of

appl~

the

Court

has

never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found
to be a

"security" simply because it is what it purports

u.s.

to be.

In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

(1943) ,

the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words

of

the

Act;

we

merely

accept

them.

In

some

344

cases,

[proving that the documents were securities] might be done
by proving the document itself, which on its face would be
a

note,

a

bond,

or

a

share

of

stock."

Id.,

at

355.

22.

~ame

alone given to an instrument ma¥ not be djsposjtive,

it also is not

~~elevant,

where the instrument

b~e

l:i-Bilal in<'Hcia of stock, the Court wjJl give proper effect
to

the

correct

421

name.

that

u

s.,

eso

at

in Forman we eschewed a

that would

invoke

instrument

carried

the

label

eliminate

the

Court's

however,

the Acts'

instrument

is covered when

the label.

~

{

, ftsa

251.

ff·

Respondents

are

"literal" approach

coverage simply because the
"stock ...
ability

Forman does
to

hold

its character is tics

ll-10 1 ~

not,

that

an

bear out

•

1 &~,

c_:eoond, we would note that the Howey test was designed
to

determine

whether

a

particular

"investment contract," not whether
the

,,

examples

listed

,el

I

in

the

instrument

it fits

statutory

is

within~

definition

an
of
of

23.

~c~ witt\~ vit?W.
~ u~'-4-etl l..f.eu-~ ~Qv-... v. For~ I

OM

Ult?eS

~rDI..
11

security ...

that

t:he

instruments at

"' inves ~ment

:i:-ssue

r ej teratQd that it

test

11

to

-f · \(

~

there,

if

~-terAA+t" rt-4
~~lu-ot-L !{ ~~r2A;!

;~

~c-..

·

not stock,

determine

(emphasis

were-

International
Daniel,

439

u.s.

6~

551

'

(1979)

J-

~i'~&ppropriate to turn to the Howey
whether

a

particular

arrangement constitutes an investment
5-liS

1

contracts ...

Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
\tJQ

•

'Forman appl i ed the tes l only to the argument

j.

financial

~

contract.~~~

added) )r~, ~he

Howey

test

to

4 1n support of their contention that the Court has
mandated use of the Howey test whenever it determines
whether an instrument is a 11 Security, .. respondents quote
our statement in Daniel that the Howey test 11 'embodies the
essential attributes that run through all of the Court's
decisions defining a security.' 11 439 u.s. 551, 558 n.ll
(1979) (quoting Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 852 (1975)).
We do
not read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do.
We made the statement in Forman in reference to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were
not 11 stock 11 and were not 11 investment contracts, .. at least
they were 11 instrument[s) commonly known as a 'security"'
within the statutory definition.
We stated, as part of
our analysis of whether the instruments were .. investment
contracts, .. that we perceived 11 no distinction, for present
purposes,
between
an
'investment
contract'
and
an
'instrument commonly known as a 11 Security ... , ..
421 u.s.,
Footnote continued on next page.

24.

traditional
listed

stock

in the

enumeration

of

and

all

many

types

were

instruments

of

instruments

superfluous.

u.s.

See

322, 343 (1967).

we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts

intended to cover

privately negotiated
of

of

678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982).

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
~

types

statutory definition would make the Acts'

Golden v. Garafalo,

~~,

other

control

to

only "passive investors" and not

transactions

"entrepreneurs."

several provisions

involving

the

transfer

The

Act

contains

1934

specifically governing

tender offers,

at 852 (emphasis added).
This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was
alleged to be a security, but only that once the label
"stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to
analyse the case differently whether we viewed the
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within
another similarly general category of the definition--an
"instrument commonly known as a security."
Under either
of these general categories, the Howey test would apply.

~

·

2S.
'

'

disclosure

of

principal

transactions

stockholders,

and

by

corporate

the

recovery

profits gained by such persons.
14,

16,

17

definition

u.s.c.

§§

78n,

"security"

of

of

~.,

See,

78p.

officers

short-swing
1934 Act, §§

Eliminating

instruments

and

from

the

involved

in

transactions where control passed to the purchaser would
contravene the purposes of these provisions.

Accord Daily

v.

Furthermore,

Morgan,

701

F.2d

496,

S03

(CAS

although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, lS
private

transactions

provisions,

there

is

antifraud provisions.

from
no

1983).

u.s.c.

the

comparable

§77d(2), exempts

Act's

registration

exemption

from

the

Thus, the structure and language of

the Acts refute respondents' position.s

Sin
criticizing
the
sale
of
business
doctrine,
Professor Loss agrees.
He considers that the doctrine
Footnote continued on next page.

26.

B

we now turn to CA9's concern that treating stock as a
specific

category

of

"security"

provable

by

its

characteristics means that other categories listed in the
statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the

~.Lv/
same
other

way.

Although

instruments

character is tics,

we

may

do

not

decide

.,.. u 2 de,..
be provable

by

whether/\ notes
their

stoc,k

categories

and

we do point out several reasons why we }-'/...L
~~-

think

name

or

may

be

distinguishable

'-'J ~

o.LG ~

from A the . other

listed in the Acts' definition.

"comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the
fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions: for
nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the
sale of a publicly owned business for stock of the
acquiring
corporation
that
is
distributed
to
the
shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating
dividend
does
not
involve
a
security."
L.
Loss,
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983) (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted).

...

'

27.

.

Instruments that bear both the name and all of the
usual

characteristics

clearest case for
definition.
people,
the

stock

seem

to

us

to

be

the

coverage by the plain language of the

First, traditional stock "represents to many

both

paradigm

~0.

of

trained
of

a

and

untrained

security."

in business matters,

Daily

v.

Morgan,

supra,

Thus persons trading in traditional stock likely

have a high expectation that their activities are governed
by the Acts.

Second, as we made clear in Forman, "stock"

is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to
consistent

definition.

instruments,

See

therefore,

p.

10,

supra.

traditional

Unlike

stock

is

some
more

susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor
different

Loss

from

the

has
other

agreed

that

categories

stock
of

is

~w
H

instrum~

:e

28.

..

observes
Howey

that

test

"investment

for

it

"goes against

determining

contract"

to

the

whether

grain"
an

traditional

to apply

instrument

is

L.

stock.

Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212

the
an

Loss,

(1983).

As

Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical
cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home,
not a security: or that not every installment
purchase 'note' is a security; or that a person
who charges a restaurant meal by signing his
credit card slip is not selling a security even
though
his
signature
is
an
• evidence
of
indebtedness. •
But
stock
(except
for
the
residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially a
security as to foreclose further analysis."
(emphasis in original).

r

We recognize that in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320

u.s.

with

344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"

"stock"

as

categories

listed

in

the

statutory

definition that were standardized enough to rest on their
names.

Id. ,

at

355.

Nonetheless,

in

Forman,

we

29.

..

421

characterized Joiner's language as dictum.
850.

u.s.,

at

As we recently suggested in a different context in

Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,

u.s.

__,

viewed

(1984),

as

a

[104

2979],

s.ct.

relatively

broad

"note"

term

that

may

now be

encompasses

instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending
on whether

issued

in

a

consumer

context,

as

paper, or in some other investment context.
[104

s.ct.,

at

2986-2988].

commercial
See id., at

We here expressly leave

'-------

until another day the question whether "notes" or "bonds"
or

some

other

category

of

instrument

listed

in

the

definition might be shown "by proving [only] the document
itself."
We

hold

SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, at 355.
only

that

"stock"

may be viewed as

being

in a

30.

category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope
of the Acts' definition of "security."

IV
We

also

employing

perceive
the

circumstances
admission,
case
Under

on

sale
of

of

this

application

whether

strong

of

control

the doctrine,

policy

business

reasons

doctrine

case.

By

the

doctrine

has

the Acts'

passed

for

not

under

the

respondents'
depends

to

the

in

own
each

purchaser.

coverage would have to be

determined on a case-by-case basis, depending

in part on

the

number

percentage

of

stock

transferred,

the

of

purchasers, and what provisions for voting and veto rights
were also agreed upon by the parties.

Thus, coverage by

the Acts would i~ e be uncertain: it is possible
that

under

some

circumstances

the

same

stock

could

be

31.

deemed to be "securities" as to some purchasers, but not
as

to others,

or as to the sellers, but not the buyers.

We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability
of

the

Weaver,
argument

Acts

455

would

u.s.

that

the

be

intolerable.

551,

559

n.

9

Cf.

(1982)

Marine

Bank

(rejecting

certificate of deposit at

issue

v.
the

there

was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it
was

pledged).

petitioner's
federal

Respondents

approach will

courts

however,
never

the

prospect

that

adopting

the workload of

the

state and common law fraud

w
~e

find "t."h more daunting,

that parties

to a

transaction may

know for J.otHe whether they are covered by the Acts

until they engage in

a

increase

by converting

claims into federal clad

argue

~1--e-~
e~&es

"'

concept~~~s

d1scovery and litigation over

elusive as the passage of control. 6

Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.

32.

Accord Golden v. Garafalo,

678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146

(CA2

1982) •

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a
"security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply.

The judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
is therefore

6 It might be argued that this case, involving the
transfer of 100% of the corporation's stock, is an easy
one in which to discern whether control has passed.
We
think even that assertion is open to some question under
the circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had
no intention of running the sawmill themselves and Ivan
Landreth apparently stayed on to manage the daily affairs
of the business.
The District Court CQ£tai~1¥ was -t;
required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of
control, before it was able to decide the case. Petn App.
13a. If this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how
much greater the unpredictability would be in a case such
as Gould v. Ruefenacht, ___ u.s. ___ (1985), decided today
as a companion to the case at bar, involving the sale of
50% of a corporation's stock.

33.

Reversed.

No. 83-1961

LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY,

PETITIONER, v.

IVAN K. LANDRETH,

et al.

On

Writ

of

Certiorari

to

the

United

States

Court

of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

[April

__,

1985)

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case presents the question whether the sale of all
of

the

stock

of

a

company

is

a

securities

transaction

2.

subject

to

the

antifraud

provisions

of

the

federal

securities laws (the Acts).

I

"fh-is action arises out of the sale
K.

~

Landreth and his sons ~ all of the outstanding stock

of a -G loaely
in

::!'xJ- lumber b~:::Je- they mtned:L-an~ate<Y-

Tonasket,

state

brokers.

company's
fire,

The

Washington.

their stock for

the

by' i_espondents Ivan

family

offered

sale through both Washington and out-ofBefore

sawmill was
the

Landreth

a

purchaser

heavily damaged

brokers continued

p~cJ ~~' ~ """;~ o t

was
by

to offer

found,

fire.
the

the

Despite
stock

for

ha J~"Y", .t...J .f-eU

sale . -a.Qvi ~ that the mill would be completely rebuilt
and modernized.

~.,

3.

Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter

0

"

.L.o

1"'-

offering

(,C.\•J, 0 C ~ (;tt., 'J

the

stock

predicted

contracts,

salee!J and

c.--.ur,...·~

'

representations as t e'-

the

for

and

eereaiR 51

makiR'i:J

~

e extent of the rebuilding plans,

productivity
expected

the

of

profits ,

mill,

Dennis

existing

~
W'&&

interested

/-(.
~

talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired

to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After

having

conducted,

an

audit

Dennis

agreed

and

an

to

stock in the lumber company .
stay on as a

consultant for

c..~

acquiring

the

with

lumber

the

of

the
the

mill

all

common

~ Ivan

Landreth agreed to

time to help with

the

Dennis assigned the stock

f.,. Jn,_

comp~RY

lumber

of

purchase

some

daily operations of the mill.
to B & D Company, a

inspection

formed for the sole purpose of

company

company,

stock.

forming

B

&

D then merged

petitioner

Landreth

4.

Timber

Company.

petitioner's

Dennis

Class

A

Bolten

and

stock,

owned

representing

85%

all

of

of

the

equity, and six other investors together owned the Class B
stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed,

the mill did not

live up to the purchasers' expectations.

Rebuilding costs

exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out
to be

incompatible with existing equipment.

petitioner

sold

receivership.

the

mill

Petitioner

at
then

a

loss

filed

Eventually,

and

this

went

suit

into

seeking

rescission of the sale of stock and $2,500,000 in damage sG)

alleg f~
their

that respondents

stock

without

had ~

registering

Securities Act of 1933, 15

u.s.c.

Act).

alleged

Petitionerj

also

it

as

and then sold

required

§77a, et seq.,
that

by

the

(the 1933

respondents

had

5.

i

negligently or
had

failed

intentionally made misrepresentations and

to state material

facts

as

to

the worth and

prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

u.s.c.

§78a, et seq.

(the 1934 Act) •
Respondents

moved

for

summary

judgment on

the ground

that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under

the

petitioner
meaning

"sale

so-called
had

of

respondents'

not

those

purchased
Acts.

include

constituting
possessed

a

"security"
District

doctrine,
within

Court

the

granted

motion and dismissed the complaint for want

of federal jurisdiction.
statutes

The

business"

of

a

all

It acknowledged that the federal

"stock"

"security,"
of

the

as

one

and

that

of
the

characteristics

the

instruments

stock
of

at

issue

conventional

6.

stock.

Nonetheless,

it

"growing

majority"

courts

of

joined

what

that

had

it

termed

held

that

the
the

federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100%
of

the

13a.

u.s.

stock

of a

Petn App.

closely held corporation.

Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421
837

(1975), and SEC v. w.J. Howey Co., 328

u.s.

293

(1946), the District Court ruled that the stock could not
be

considered

a

entered

into

earning

profits

"security"

the

transaction
derived

from

unless
with
the

the
the

purchaser

had

anticipation

of

efforts

of

others.

Finding that managerial control of the business had passed
into

the

hands

of

the

purchasers,

and

thus,

that

the

transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical
investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.

'
....

;

7.

The

United

States

Circuit affirmed
sale of business

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Ninth

the District Court's application ·of the
13\ f."2ol nva (Jct8'1).

doctrine. ~ It agreed that it was bound by

~I

Forman J and
whether

Howey,

the

indicated

supra,

economic

that

to

determine

realities

of

in . every
the

case

transaction

the Acts applied. . Because the Courts of

Appeals are divided over the applicability of the federal
securities laws when a business is sold by the transfer of
100% of

its stock,

(1984).

We now reverse.

u.s.

we granted certiorari.

II
It

is

axiomatic

that

"[t]he

starting

point

in

every

case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself."
723,

756

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
(1975)

(POWELL,

J

0

'

concurring);

u.s.

accord

8.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
551, 558

(1979).

Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15

u.s.

u.s.c.

§77b(l), defines a "security" as including
"any
note,
stock,
treasury
stock,
bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate
or
subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of
interest or participation in,
temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to ~ubscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing."
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver,

455

u.s.

551,

556

(1982),

1 we have repeatedly ruled
that
the definitions of
"security" in §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act and §2(1) of the
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as
such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982);
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 847
n.l2 (1975).

9.

and

includes

well-settled

both

instruments

meaning,

variable character

as

[that]

whose

well

as

names

alone

instruments

carry

of

"more

were necessarily designated by

more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and
"instrument commonly known as a 'security.'"
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

u.s.

c.

SEC v.

344, 351 (1943).

M.

The face

of the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a
"security" within the meaning of the Acts.
in

United

Housing

Foundation

v.

Forman,

As we observed
421

u.s.

837

(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title
are likely to be covered by the definition.
As

we

also

recognized

in

instruments

bear

the

"stock"

label

Forman,
is

!d., at 850.
the

fact

not

of

sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts.
concluded

that

we

must

also

determine

that
itself

Rather, we

whether

those

10.

instruments

possess

"some

of

significant

the

characteristics typically associated with" stock,
851,

recognizing

"stock"

and

purchaser

that when an

bears

stock's

justifiably

instrument is both called
usual

[may]

characteristics,

assume

securities laws apply," id., at 850.

that

the

receive

to

apportionment

of

dividends

profits;

(ii)

"a

federal

We identified those

character is tics usually associated with stock as
right

id., at

contingent
negotiability;

ability to be pledged or hypothecated;

( i)

the

upon

an

(iii)

the

(iv) the ability to

confer voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value.
Under

the

instruments

at

facts
issue

of

Forman,

there were

the meaning of the Acts.

Id.

- -)

that

,J- 8Sj.

we

concluded

the

not

"securities" within

That case involved the sale of

11.

shares

of

stock

entitling

the

purchaser

the

characteristics

listed

above

associated with traditional stock.

lease

an

The stock bore none

apartment in a housing cooperative.
of

to

that

are

usually

Moreover, we concluded

that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that
the purchasers had been misled by use of the word "stock"
into

thinking

that

their purchases.

the

federal

securities

laws governed

The purchasers had intended to acquire

low-cost subsidized living space for

their personal use;

no one was likely to have believed that he was purchasing
investment securities.
In contrast,

~

it is undisputed that the stock involved

here possesses all of the characteristics we identified in
Forman
the

as

traditionally

District Court

associated

so found.

with

Petn App.

stock.
13a.

Indeed,
Moreover,

12.

unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved
here--the sale of

stock

in a corporation--is typical of

the context to which the Acts normally apply.
much

more

likely

would

believe

he

laws.

Under

the

meaning

of

the

here
was

than

in

covered

statutory

Forman

that

the

federal

by

circumstances

It is thus

of

this

definition

an

investor

securities

case,

the

mandates

plain

that

the

stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage
of the Acts.
Reading
stock

at

purpose
by

the

securities

issue

here

in enacting

"compelling

issuance of

full

'the

commercial world

laws

comports

to apply
with

to

the

Congress's

sale of
remedial

the legislation to protect investors
and

many
fall

fair

types
within

disclosure relative to the
of
the

instruments

that

in our

ordinary concept

of

a

13.

security."
(1946)

SEC

v.

W.J.

Howey

Co.,

328

U.S.

293,

299

(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11

(1933)).

Although

we

recognize

that

intend to provide a broad federal
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455

u.s.

Congress

remedy for

did

not

all fraud,

551, 556 (1982), we think

it would improperly narrow Congress's broad definition of
"security"

to hold

that

the

traditional

stock

at

issue

here falls outside the Acts' coverage.
III

Under
statutory

other

circumstances,

analysis

outlined

we

above

might

consider

to

a

be

answer compelling judgment for petitioner f . 2

the

sufficient
Respondents

2 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory
analysis is
sufficient.
L.
Loss,
Fundamentals
of
Securities
Regulation 212 (1983). See pp.
infra.

2J-2 f ,
'

1

14.

urge,

however,

that

including Forman,
"stock"

and

language

in

our

previous

opinions,

requires that we look beyond the label

the

character is tics

of

instruments

the

involved to determine whether application of the Acts is
mandated

by

the

economic

substance

of

the

transaction.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the
plain meaning

of

stock

the

definition would

hold

this

way"

to justify treating notes,

definitional

covered,

categories

because

it

be

saw

bonds,

differently.

sufficient

"no principled

and other of
We

to

address

the

these

concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely
clear
when

on
an

the

proper

instrument

method
is

a

of

analysis

"security."

for
This

determining
Court

has

15.

decided

a

number

of

cases

in

which

it

looked

to

the

economic substance of the transaction, rather than just to
its form,
v.

C.M.

to determine whether the Acts applied.
Joiner

Leasing Corp.,

320

u.s.

344

In SEC

(1943),

for

example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied
to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a proposed
oil

well

drilling.

interests

were

reach

the

of

commonplace."

In

holding

"securities,"
Act

does

not

that

the

Court

stop

with

the
noted
the

leasehold
that

obvious

"the
and

1! · J ~>(.
[~ather, it ruled that unusual devices such

as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt
in

under

terms

or

courses

of

their character in commerce as

dealing

which

established

'investment contracts,' or

16.

as

'any

interest

or

instrument

'security.'"

~

SEC v.

Howey Co.

w.J.

328

I

commonly

u.s.

293

known

(1946)

I

as

a

further

elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual
instrument

could

be

considered

a

"security"

circumstances of the transaction so dictated.
that

case

was

an

offering

of

units

of

development coupled with

a contract for

marketing

remitting

investors.
an
Act

the

fruit

and

the

a

if

the

At issue in
citrus

grove

cultivating and
proceeds

to

the

The Court held that the offering constituted

"investment contract"
because,

looking

at

within
the

the meaning of
economic

the 1933

realities,

the

transaction "involve[d] an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."

Id., at 301.

I:

17.

This
second

so-called

"Howey test"

part

our

of

decision

respondents primarily rely.
II,

supra,

the

formed

first

the basis for

in

on

Forman,

the

which

As discussed above, see Part

part

of

our

decision

in

Forman

concluded that the instruments at issue, while they bore
the

traditional

label

"stock,"

were

not

"securities"

because they possessed none of the usual character is tics
of stock.

We then went on to address the argument that

the instruments were "investment contracts."
Howey
were

test,
not

we

concluded

"securities"

contracts"

because

transaction

showed

their money not for

by

the
that

that

the

virtue
economic

the

Applying the

instruments
of

being

"investment
of

the

parted

with

realities

purchasers

had

likewise

the purpose of reaping profits from

18.

the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a
commodity for personal consumption.

421

u.s.,

at 858.

Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it

was

shares

based 3
of

stock

"securities"
Instead,

require

they

at

because
argue

of

us

to

issue
their

that our

reject
here
name
cases

the
may
and

view
be

that

the

considered

characteristics.

require

us

in every

3 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
u.s. 332 (1967), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551
(1982) , as support for their argument that we have
mandated in every case a determination of whether the
economic
realities
of
a
transaction
call
for
the
application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here
that
these
cases,
like
the
other
cases
on
which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did
not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific
kinds of securities listed in the definition.
See pp. 1923,
infra.
Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver
involved
a
certificate of deposit
and
a
privately
negotiated profit sharing agreement. See 455 u.s. 551, at
557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of
deposit
involved
in Weaver did not fit within the
definition's category "certificate of deposit,
for a
security."

k '

19.

case to look to the economic substance of the transaction
to

determine

According

to

whether

the

respondents,

Howey
it

test

is

clear

has

been

met.

that

petitioner

sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but
to

buy

a

company

that

it

could

manage

and

control.

Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the

bu~iness

purchased just

as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they

acquired

after

purchasing

shares

of

stock.

Thus,

respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We
cases.

disagree

with

respondents'

interpretation

of

our

First, it is important to understand the contexts

within which these cases were decided.

All of the cases

on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not

20.

easily characterized as

"securities."

Thus,

if the Acts

were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have
been

because

the

economic

reality

underlying

the

transaction indicated that the instrument was actually of
a type that falls within the usual concept of a security.
In the case at bar,
is

traditional

definition.
prior

cases,

stock,

There
to

in contrast, the instrument involved
plainly

within

is no need here,

look

beyond

the

the

statutory

as there was in the

character is tics

of

the

Court

has

instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary

to

respondents'

implication,

the

never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found
to be a "security" simply because it is what it purports

u.s.

to be.

In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

344

(1943) ,

the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words

21.

of

the

Act;

we

merely

accept

them • ••• In

some

cases,

/\
[proving that the documents were securities) might be done
by proving the document itself, which on its face would be
a note, a bond, or a share of stock."

!d., at 355.

does Forman require a different result.
correct

that

in Forman we eschewed a

that would

invoke

instrument

carried

the

label

eliminate

the

Court's

however,

the Acts'

Nor

Respondents are

"literal" approach

coverage simply because the
"stock."

instrument

is covered when

the label.

See pp. 9-10, supra.

ability

Forman does
to

hold

its character is tics

not,

that
bear

an
out

Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed
to

determine

whether

a

particular

"investment contract," not whether
the

examples

listed

in

the

instrument

it fits within

statutory

is

an

~

of

definition

of

22.

"security."

Our

cases

are

.
cons1stent

. h
w1t

th.1s

4
.
v1ew.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
551, 558 ( 1979)

determine

u.s.

(appropriate to turn to the Howey test •G o

whether

a

particular

financial

arrangement

4
In support of their contention that the Court has
mandated use of the Howey test whenever it determines
whether an instrument is a "security," respondents quote
our statement in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential
attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions
defining a security.'" 439 u.s. 551, 558 n.ll (1979)
(quoting Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 852 (1975)).
We do not
read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We
made
the
statement
in Forman
in
reference
to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were
not "stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least
they were "instrument [s] commonly known as a 'security'"
within the statutory definition.
We stated, as part of
our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment
contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present
purposes,
between
an
'investment
contract •
and
an
'instrument commonly known as a "security.'""
421 u.s.,
at 852 (emphasis added).
This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was
alleged to be a security, but only that once the label
"stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to
analyse
the case differently whether we viewed the
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within
another similarly general category of the definition--an
"instrument commonly known as a security."
Under either
of these general categories, the Howey test would apply.

23.

constitutes

an

investment

contract."):

United

Foundation v. Forman, supra: see p. 17, supra.

Housing
Moreover,

applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other
types
would

of

instruments

make

instruments

the

listed

Acts'

the

statutory definition

enumeration

superfluous.

1139, 1144 (CA2 1982).

in

Golden

v.

of

many

types

Garafalo,

678

See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389

of
F.2d

u.s.

)
3/ 2, 343 (1967).

Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were

intended

to cover

privately negotiated
of

control

to

only "passive investors" and not

transactions

"entrepreneurs."

involving

the transfer

The

Act

1934

several provisions specifically governing
disclosure
principal

of

transactions

stockholders,

and

contains

tender offers,

by

corporate

officers

the

recovery of

and

short-swing

24.

profits gained by such persons.

~.,

See,

1934 Act, §§

,.,
I

14,

16,

lf

definition

u.s.c.
of

§§

78n,

78p.

"security"

Eliminating

instruments

from

the

involved

in

transactions where control passed to the purchaser would
contravene the purposes of these provisions.

Accord Daily

v.

Furthermore,

Morgan,

701

F.2d

496,

S03

(CAS

although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, lS
private

transactions

provisions,

there

is

antifraud provisions.

from
no

1983).

u.s.c.

the

comparable

§77d(2), exempts

Act's

registration

exemption

from

the

Thus, the structure and language of

the Acts refute respondents' position.s

Sin
criticizing
the
sale
of
business
doctrine,
Professor Loss agrees.
He considers that the doctrine
"comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the
fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for
nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the
sale of a publicly owned business for stock of the
acquiring
corporation
that
is
distributed
to
the
shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating
Footnote continued on next page.

25.

B

We now turn to CA9's concern that treating stock as a
specific

category

of

"security"

provable

by

its

characteristics means that other categories listed in the
statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the
same way.

Although we do not decide whether coverage of

notes or other instruments may be provable by their name
and characteristics, we do point out several reasons why
we think stock may be distinguishable from most if not all
of the other categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the
usual

characteristics

of

stock

seem

to

us

to

be

the

dividend
does
not
involve
a
security."
L.
Loss,
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983) (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted).

26.

clearest case
definition.
people,

for

coverage by the plain language of

First,

both

traditional stock "represents to many

trained

and

untrained

the paradigm of a security."
500.

Thus

persons

the

trading

in business matters,

Daily v. Morgan, supra, at
in

traditional

stock

likely

have a high expectation that their activities are governed
by the Acts.

Second, as we made clear in Forman, "stock"

is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to
consistent

definition.

instruments,

Seep.

therefore,

10,

supra.

traditional

Unlike

stock

is

some
more

susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from
the other categories of instruments.
"goes

against

determining

the

grain"

whether

an

to

He observes that it

apply

the

instrument

is

Howey
an

test

for

"investment

27.

contract" to traditional stock.
Securities Regulation 211-212

L. Loss, Fundamentals of
(1983) •

As Professor

Loss

explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical
cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home,
not a security; or that not every installment
purchase 'note' is a security; or that a person
who charges a restaurant meal by signing his
credit card slip is not selling a security even
though
his
signature
is
an
'evidence
of
indebtedness. '
But
stock
(except
for
the
residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially a
secu_r..ili a
to foreclose further analysis."
<
emphas_is in origi ~
at 212." / ?
we recognize that in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320

u.s.

with

344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"

"stock"

as

categories

listed

in

the

statutory

definition that were standardized enough to rest on their
names.

Id.,

at

355.

Nonetheless,

in

characterized Joiner's language as dictum.
850.

Forman,
421

u.s.,

we
at

As we recently suggested in a different context in

28.

Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,

u.s.

__,

viewed

(1984),

as

a

[104

2979),

s.ct.

relatively

broad

"note"

term

may

that

now

be

encompasses

instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending
on whether
paper, or
[104

issued

in

a

consumer

context,

as

in some other investment context.
s.ct.,

at

2986-2988).

commercial
See id., at

We here expressly leave

until another day the question whether "notes" or "bonds"
or

some

other

category

of

instrument

listed

definition might be shown "by proving [only)
itself."
We

hold

in

the

the document

SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, at 355.
only

that

"stock"

may be

viewed

as

being

in a

category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope
of the Acts' definition of "security."

IV

t.

We

perceive

also

employing

the

circumstances
admission,
on

sale
of

of

this

application

whether

policy

strong

of

control

business

reasons

doctrine

case.

By

the

doctrine

has

passed

for

not

under

the

respondents'

to

depends
the

own

in

each

purchaser. )
"""" ~ c.~

-h•ve
aeeermined on a case by

--------.....

the

percentage

of

ca~e

stock

basjs,

depend ~

transferred,

te 13e

in part on

the

number

of

urchasers, and what provisions for voting and veto
were also agreed upon by the
the

Acts

\.~~~~
~~certaiflJ

would

~~~
it is possjhle that und.er

seme cit cams Lances the same stock coul9 be <3eemed to .be
"se.c..nrities" as to some purchasers, aut not as to others,
~~c--,

sr

as

these

to

the

Sellers,

uncertainties

but not

attending

the
the

buyers.

E

applicability

hel ieve_
of

the

30.

Acts would be intolerable.

u.s.

551, 559 n. 9 (1982)

certificate

Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
(rejecting the argument that the

of

deposit

at

issue

chameleon-like,

into a

.. security ..

there
once

was

transformed,

it was

pledged) •

Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will
increase the workload of the federal courts by converting
state and common law fraud claims into federal claims.
find more daunting, however,
a

the prospect that parties to

transaction may never know whether

the

Acts

until

they

We

engage

in

they are covered by

extended

discovery

and

litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage
of

contro1. 6

6 I.t

might:

Accord

he

Golden

v.

Garafalo,

678

F.2d

1139,

argued that this case,
involving the
of the cor!3oration' s stoek, is an easy
orre-i-n-wh-i:ch to diseern whether control has passed. L we
think even that assertion is open to some question under
the circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had
Footnote continued on next page.

~00%

1

31.

1145-1146 (CA2 1982) •

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a
"security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply.

The judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
is therefore
Reversed.
I

:\:o~ ~ob

lct..M""

wko~

'be.U~~{ ~

• R~ t.eo..~ ~tu. ~)(
~ .l).UA~

..J)

let ~0

&f

Q.

·

~kc.L

~~~ 'l. ~

~~fret:,\,~~-~~~

A..

~~~1~~-

no intention of
nning the sawmill themselves and Iva
Landreth apparent
stayed on to manage the daily affa' s
of the business.
1he District Court was require
to
undertake extensive fact-finding,
and ~ re ested
supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of ontrol,
before it was able to decide the case. j Petn App 13a ~ If
this degree of uncertainty attends this cas , how much
greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as
Gould v. Ruefenacht,
u.s.
(1985),
cided today as
a companion to the case at bar, involvin the sale of 50%
of a corporation's stock.

£a.~,
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LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER, v.

IVAN K. LANDRETH,

et al.

On

Writ

of

Certiorari
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the

United

States
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of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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[April __ , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case presents the question whether the sale of all
of

the

stock

of

a

company

is

a

securities

transaction

2.

subject

to

the

antifraud

provisions

of

the

federal

securities laws (the Acts).

I

Respondents Ivan K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated
in

Tonasket,

The

washington.

Landreth

family

offered

their stock for sale through both Washington and out-ofstate

brokers.

company's
the

fire,

sale.

Before

a

purchaser

was

sawmill was heavily damaged by
the

brokers continued

to offer

fire.
the

Potential purchasers were advised of

but were told
and modernized.

found,

the

Despite
stock

for

the damage,

that the mill would be completely rebuilt

3.

Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale.

On the basis of the

letter's representations concerning the rebuilding plans,
predicted

the

productivity

of

the

mill,

existing

contracts, and expected profits, Dennis became interested
in

acquiring

former

the

stock.

client who had

He

inspection

of

the

to

John

retired to Florida,

him in investigating the offer.
an

talked

mill

Bolten,

about

a

joining

After having an audit and

conducted,

purchase all of the common stock

Dennis

agreed

to

in the lumber company.

Ivan Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time

to

help

with

the

daily

operations

of

the

mill.

Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a corporation
formed

for

the

company stock.

sole

purpose

of

acquiring

the

lumber

B & D then merged with the lumber company,

4.

forming

petitioner

Bolten

owned

representing
together

Landreth

all
85% of

owned

the

of

Timber

petitioner's

the equity,
Class

B

Dennis

Company.

A

Class

and six other
stock,

and

stock,

investors

representing

the

remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed,

the mill did not

live up to the purchasers' expectations.

Rebuilding costs

exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out
to be

Eventually,

incompatible with existing equipment.

petitioner

sold

receivership.

the

mill

Petitioner

at
then

a

loss

filed

and

this

went

suit

into

seeking

rescission of the sale of stock and $2,500,000 in damages,
alleging that respondents had widely offered and then sold
their

stock

without

registering

Securities Act of 1933, 15

u.s.c.

it

as

required

§77a, et seq.,

by

the

(the 1933

5.

Act).

Petitioner

negligently or
had

failed

also

alleged

that

respondents

had

intentionally made misrepresentations and

to state material

facts

as

to the worth and

prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

u.s.c.

§78a, et seq.

( the 19 3 4 Act ) .
Respondents

moved

for

summary

judgment on

the ground

that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under

the

petitioner
meaning

so-called
had

of

respondents'

not

those

"sale

purchased

include

constituting

a

doctrine,

business"
"security"

District

within

Court

the

granted

motion and dismissed the complaint for want

of federal jurisdiction.
statutes

The

Acts.

of

a

It acknowledged that the federal

"stock"

"security,"

as

one

and

that

of
the

the

instruments

stock

at

issue

6.

possessed

all

of

the

characteristics

stock.

Nonetheless,

it

"growing

majority"

courts

of

joined

of

what

that

conventional

it

had

termed

held

that

the
the

federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100%
of

the

13a.

u.s.

Petn App.

stock of a closely held corporation.

Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421
837

(1975), and SEC v.

w.J.

Howey co., 328

u.s.

293

(1946), the District Court ruled that the stock could not
be

considered

a

entered

into

earning

profits

"security"

the

transaction
derived

from

unless
with
the

the
the

purchaser

had

anticipation

of

efforts

of

others.

Finding that managerial control of the business had passed
into

the

hands

of

the

purchasers,

and

thus,

that

the

transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical
investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.

•'

·:

..

7.

The

United

States

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Ninth

Circuit affirmed the District Court's application of the
sale

of

business

731

doctrine.

F.2d

1348

(1984}.

It

agreed that it was bound by United Housing Foundation v.
Forman,

supra,

and

SEC

w.J.

v.

Howey

Co.,

supra,

to

determine in every case whether the economic realities of
the transaction indicated that the Acts applied.

Because

the Courts of Appeals are divided over the applicability
of the federal securities laws when a business is sold by
the transfer of 100% of its stock, we granted certiorari.

u.s.

(1984}.

We now reverse.
II

It

is

axiomatic

that

"[t]he

starting

point

in every

case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself."

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421

u.s.

8.

723,

756

(1975)

(POWELL,

J.,

concurring);

accord

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
551,

558

(1979).

Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15

u.s.

u.s.c.

§77b(l), defines a "security" as including
"any
note,
stock,
treasury
stock,
bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization
certificate
or
subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of
interest or
participation
in,
temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to ~ubscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing."
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad,
and

Marine Bank v.

includes

well-settled

both

instruments

meaning,

variable character

weaver,

as

[that]

well

455

u.s.

whose
as

551,
names

556
alone

instruments

of

(1982),
carry
"more

were necessarily designated by

more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and

9.

"instrument commonly known as a 'security.'"
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

u.s.

c.

SEC v.

344, 351 (1943).

M.

The face

of the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a
"security" within the meaning of the Acts.
in

United

Housing

Foundation

v.

Forman,

As we observed

u.s.

421

837

(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title
are likely to be covered by the definition.
As

we

also

recognized

in

instruments

bear

the

"stock"

label

Forman,
is

Id., at 850.
the

fact

not

of

sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts.
concluded

that

instruments

we

must

possess

also
"some

determine
of

the

recognizing

"stock"

and

itself

Rather, we

whether

those

significant

character is tics typically associated with" stock,
851,

that

id., at

that when an instrument is both called

bears

stock's

usual

characteristics,

"a

10.

purchaser

[may]

justifiably

assume

that

securities laws apply, .. id., at 850.

the

federal

We identified those

characteristics usually associated with stock as
right

to

receive

apportionment

of

dividends

profits;

(ii)

contingent
negotiability;

ability to be pledged or hypothecated;

( i)

the

upon

an

(iii)

the

(iv) the ability to

confer voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned; and

(v)

the capacity to appreciate in value.

Id.,

at 851.
Under

the

instruments

at

facts
issue

of

of

stock

we

the

entitling

characteristics

that

the

.. securities.. within

That case involved the sale of
the

purchaser

apartment in a housing cooperative.
of

concluded

there were not

the meaning of the Acts.
shares

Forman,

listed

to

lease

an

The stock bore none

above

that

are

usually

11.

associated with traditional stock.

Moreover, we concluded

that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that
the purchasers had been misled by use of the word "stock"
into

thinking

that

their purchases.

the

federal

securities

laws governed

The purchasers had intended to acquire

low-cost subsidized living space for

their personal use:

no one was likely to have believed that he was purchasing
investment securities.
In contrast,

Ibid.

it is undisputed that the stock involved

here possesses all of the characteristics we identified in
Forman

as

traditionally

the District Court

associated

so found.

with

Petn App.

stock.
13a.

Indeed,
Moreover,

unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved
here--the

sale of

stock

in a corporation--is typical of

the context to which the Acts normally apply.

It is thus

12.

much

more

likely

would

believe

he

laws.

Under

the

meaning

of

the

here
was

than

in

covered

that

the

federal

by

circumstances
statutory

Forman

of

this

definition

an

investor

securities

case,

the

mandates

plain

that

the

stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage
of the Acts.
Reading
stock

at

purpose
by

the

securities

issue

here

in enacting

"compelling

issuance

of

full

'the

commercial

world

security."

SEC

(1946)
(1933))

comports

to apply
with

to

the

sale of

Congress's

remedial

the legislation to protect investors
and

many
fall
v.

laws

fair disclosure relative to the

types of
within

W.J.

instruments

the

Howey

that

in our

ordinary concept of

Co.,

328

U.S.

293,

a

299

(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11

0

Although

we

recognize

that

Congress

did

not

13.

intend to provide a broad federal
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455

u.s.

remedy for

all fraud,

551, 556 (1982), we think

it would improperly narrow Congress's broad definition of
"security"

to hold

that

the

traditional

stock

at

issue

here falls outside the Acts' coverage.
III

Under
statutory
answer
urge,

other

circumstances,

analysis

compelling
however,

outlined

above

judgment for

that

language

we

might

consider

to

a

be

petitioner. 2
in

our

the

sufficient
Respondents

previous

opinions,

including Forman, requires that we look beyond the label
"stock"

and

the

character is tics

of

the

instruments

involved to determine whether application of the Acts is
mandated

by

the

economic

substance

of

the

transaction.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the

14.

plain meaning

of

stock

the

definition would

hold

this

way"

to justify treating notes,

definitional

covered,

categories

because

it

be

saw

bonds,

sufficient

to

"no principled

and other of the
We

differently.

address

these

concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely
clear
when

on

the

an

decided

proper

instrument
a

number

of

method
is

a

cases

of

analysis

This

"security."
in

which

for

it

determining
Court

looked

to

has
the

economic substance of the transaction, rather than just to
its form,
v.

C.M.

to determine whether the Acts applied.
Joiner

Leasing Corp.,

320

u.s.

344

In SEC

(1943),

for

example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied
to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a proposed

15.

oil

well

drilling.

interests

were

reach

the

of

commonplace."

In

holding

"securities,"
Act

does

not

Id., at 351.

that

the

Court

stop

with

the

leasehold

noted
the

that

"the

obvious

and

Rather, it ruled that unusual

devices such as the leaseholds would also be covered "if
it

be

proved

offered
which

or

as

matter

dealt

in

established

of

under
their

fact
terms

Howey Co.,

they

were

courses

of

in

widely
dealing

commerce

as

'any interest or instrument

commonly known as a 'security.'"
W.J.

or

character

'investment contracts,' or as

SEC v.

that

Ibid.
-

328 U.S.

293

(1946),

further

elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual
instrument

could

be

considered

a

"security"

circumstances of the transaction so dictated.
that

case

was

an

offering

of

units

of

a

if

the

At issue in
citrus

grove

16.

development
marketing

the

investors.
an
Act

coupled with a contract
fruit

and

remitting

for
the

cultivating and
proceeds

to

the

The Court held that the offering constituted

"investment contract"
because,

looking

within the meaning of the 1933

at

the

economic

realities,

the

transaction "involve[d] an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."
This
second

!d., at 301.
so-called

"Howey test"

part

our

of

decision

formed

the basis for

in

Forman,

on

the

which

respondents primarily rely.

As discussed above, see Part

II,

of

supra,

the

first

part

our

decision

in

Forman

concluded that the instruments at issue, while they bore
the

traditional

label

"stock,"

were

not

"securities"

because they possessed none of the usual character is tics

17.

of stock.

We then went on to address the argument that

the instruments were "investment contracts."
Howey
were

test,
not

we

concluded

"securities"

contracts"

because

transaction

showed

that

by

the
that

their money not for

the

virtue

instruments
of

economic
the

Applying the

being

"investment

realities

purchasers

had

likewise

of

the

parted

with

the purpose of reaping profits from

the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a
commodity for personal consumption.

421

u.s.,

at 858.

Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it

was

shares

based 3
of

stock

"securities"
Instead,

require

they

at

because
argue

of

us

to

issue
their

reject
here
name

the
may
and

view
be

that

the

considered

characteristics.

that our cases require

us

in every

case to look to the economic substance of the transaction

18.

to

determine

According

to

whether

the

respondents,

Howey
it

is

test
clear

has

been

met.

that

petitioner

sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but
to

buy

a

company

that

it

could

manage

and

control.

Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to nuse or consumen the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they

acquired

after

purchasing

shares

of

stock.

Thus,

respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We
cases.

disagree

with

respondents'

interpretation

of

our

First, it is important to understand the contexts

within which these cases were decided.

All of the cases

on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not
easily characterized as

nsecurities.n

Thus,

if the Acts

19.

were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have
been

because

the

economic

reality

underlying

the

transaction indicated that the instrument was actually of
a type that falls within the usual concept of a security.
In the case at bar,
is

tradi tiona!

definition.
prior

cases,

in contrast, the instrument involved

stock,

plainly

within

There is no need here,
to

look

beyond

the

the

statutory

as there was in the

character is tics

of

the

Court

has

instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary

to

respondents'

implication,

the

never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found
to be a

"security" simply because it is what it purports

u.s.

to be.

In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320

(1943) ,

the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words

of the Act; we merely accept them.

344

In some cases,

20.

[proving that the documents were securities] might be done
by proving the document itself, which on its face would be
a note, a bond, or a share of stock."

Id., at 355.

does Forman require a different result.
correct

that

in Forman we eschewed a

that would

invoke

instrument

carried

the

label

eliminate

the

Court 1 s

however,

the

Acts

Nor

Respondents are

"literal" approach

coverage simply because

1

"stock."

instrument

is covered when

the label.

See pp. 9-10, supra.

ability

Forman does
to

hold

the
not,

that

its characteristics bear

an
out

Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed
to

determine

whether

a

particular

"investment contract," not whether
the

examples

"security."

listed
Our

cases

in
are

the

instrument

it fits within

statutory

consistent

is
~

definition

with

this

an
of
of

view. 4

21.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
551, 558

(1979)

"determine

(appropriate to turn to the Howey test to

whether

constitutes

u.s.

an

a

particular

investment

financial

contract.");

arrangement

United

Foundation v. Forman, supra; see p. 17, supra.

Housing
Moreover,

applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other
types
would

of

instruments

make

instruments

the

listed

Acts'

statutory definition

enumeration

superfluous.

1139, 1144 (CA2 1982).

in the

Golden

v.

of

many

Garafalo,

types
678

See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389

of
F.2d

u.s.

332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were

intended

to cover

privately negotiated
of

control

to

only "passive investors" and not

transactions

"entrepreneurs."

involving

the transfer

The

Act

1934

contains

22.

several provisions specifically governing
disclosure

of

principal

transactions

stockholders,

and

by

corporate

the

recovery

profits gained by such persons.
14,

16,

15

definition

u.s.c.

§§

78n,

"security"

of

officers
of

~·r

See,

78p.

tender offers,

short-swing
1934 Act, §§

Eliminating

instruments

and

from

the

involved

in

transactions where control passed to the purchaser would
contravene the purposes of these provisions.

Accord Daily

v.

Furthermore,

Morgan,

701

F. 2d

496,

503

(CAS

although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15
private

transactions

provisions,

there

is

antifraud provisions.

from
no

1983) •

u.s.c.

the

comparable

§77d(2), exempts

Act's

registration

exemption

from

the

Thus, the structure and language of

the Acts refute respondents' position. 5
B

23.

We now turn to CA9's concern that treating stock as a
category

specific

"security"

of

by

provable

its

characteristics means that other categories listed in the
statutory definition,
same way.

such as notes, must be treated the

Although we do not decide whether coverage of

notes or other

instruments may be provable by their name

and characteristics, we do point out several reasons why
we think stock may be distinguishable from most if not all
of the other categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the
usual

characteristics

clearest case for
definition.
people,

both

of

stock

seem

to

us

to

be

the

coverage by the plain language of

the

First, traditional stock "represents to many
trained

and

untrained

the paradigm of a security."

in business matters,

Daily v. Morgan, supra, at

24.

500.

Thus

persons

trading

in

traditional

stock

likely

have a high expectation that their activities are governed
by the Acts.

Second, as we made clear in Forman, "stock"

is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to
consistent

See

definition.
therefore,

instruments,

p.

10,

supra.

Unlike

stock

traditional

is

some
more

susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from
the other categories of instruments.
"goes

against

determining

the

grain"

whether

an

to

apply

the

instrument

is

contract" to traditional stock.
Securities Regulation 211-212
explains,

He observes that it

L.

Howey
an

test

for

"investment

Loss, Fundamentals of

(1983).

As Professor Loss

25.

"It is one thing to say that the typical
cooperative apartment dweller has bought a horne,
not a security: or that not every installment
purchase 'note' is a security: or that a person
who charges a restaurant meal by signing his
credit card slip is not selling a security even
though
his
signature
is
an
'evidence
of
indebtedness. '
But
stock
(except
for
the
residential wrinkle} is so quintessentially a
security as to foreclose further analysis."
Id., at 212 (emphasis in original}.
We recognize that in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320

u.s.

with

344 (1943}, the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"

"stock"

as

categories

listed

in

the

statutory

definition that were standardized enough to rest on their
Id. ,

names.

at

355.

Nonetheless,

in

characterized Joiner's language as dictum.
850.

Forman,
421

u.s.,

we
at

As we recently suggested in a different context in

Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,

u.s.

__,

viewed

as

(1984},
a

[104

relatively

s.ct.

2979],

broad

term

"note"
that

may

now

be

encompasses

instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending

26.

on

whether

paper, or
__

[104

issued

in

a

consumer

in some other
s.ct.,

at

context,

as

investment context.

2986-2988].

commercial
See id., at

We here expressly leave

until another day the question whether "notes" or "bonds"
or

some

other

category

of

instrument

listed

definition might be shown "by proving [only]
itself."
We

hold

in

the

the document

SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, at 355.
only

that

"stock"

may be

viewed

as

being

in

a

category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope
of the Acts' definition of "security."

IV
We

also

employing

perceive
the

circumstances
admission,

sale
of

strong
of

this

application

of

policy

business

reasons

doctrine

case.

By

the

doctrine

for

not

under

the

respondents'
depends

own

in each

27.

case

on

Under

whether

control

the doctrine,

has

the Acts'

passed

to

the

purchaser.

coverage would have to be

determined on a case-by-case basis, depending in part on
the

percentage

of

stock

transferred,

the

number

of

purchasers, and what provisions for voting and veto rights
were also agreed upon by the par ties.

Thus, coverage by

the Acts would in most cases be uncertain; it is possible
that

under

some

circumstances

the

same

stock

could

be

deemed to be "securities" as to some purchasers, but not
as

to others, or as to the sellers, but not the buyers.

We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability
of

the

Acts

weaver,

455

argument

that

would

u.s.

be
551,

intolerable.
559

n.

9

Cf.
(1982)

Marine

Bank

(rejecting

v.
the

the certificate of deposit at issue there

was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it

28.

was

pledged} .

petitioner's

approach will

federal

courts

claims

into

however,

the

Respondents

argue

increase

the

that

adopting

workload of

the

by converting state and common law fraud

federal

claims.

prospect

that parties to a

We

find

more

daunting,

transaction may

never know whether they are covered by the Acts until they
engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept
as often elusive as the passage of contro1. 6 Accord Golden
v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145-1146 {CA2 1982}.

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a
"security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply.

The judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
is therefore

29.

Reversed.

'.

~a. Simp~
x- 3oc; d..

3/tt10/ G~
1we have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of
"security" in §3 (a) (10) of the 1934 Act and §2 (1) of the
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as
such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982):
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 847
n.l2 (1975).
2 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is
sufficient.
L.
Loss,
Fundamentals
of
Securities
Regulation 212 (1983). See pp. 26-27, infra.
3 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s.
332 (1967), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551
(1982) , as support for their argument that we have
mandated in every case a determination of whether the
economic
realities
of
a
transaction
call
for
the
application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here
that
these
cases,
like
the other
cases
on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did
not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific
kinds of securities listed in the definition. See pp. 1923,
infra.
Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver
involved
a
certificate of deposit and a
privately
negotiated profit sharing agreement. See 455 u.s. 551, at
557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of
deposit involved in Weaver did not fit within the
definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a
security."
4 In support of their contention that the Court has
mandated use of the Howey test whenever it determines
whether an instrument is a "security," respondents quote
our statement in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential
attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions
defining a security.'" 439 u.s. 551, 558 n.ll (1979)
(quoting Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 852 (1975)).
We do not
read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We
made
the
statement
in Forman
in reference
to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were

not "stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least
they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'"
within the statutory definition.
We stated, as part of
our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment
contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present
purposes,
between
an
'investment
contract'
and
an
'instrument commonly known as a "security.""'
421 u.s.,
at 852 (emphasis added).
This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was
alleged to be a security, but only that once the label
"stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to
analyse the case differently whether we viewed the
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within
another similarly general category of the definition--an
"instrument commonly known as a security."
Under either
of these general categories, the Howey test would apply.
5 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor
Loss agrees.
He considers that the doctrine "comes
dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud
prov1s1ons do not apply to private transactions: for
nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the
sale of a publicly owned business for stock of the
acqu1r1ng
corporation
that
is
distributed
to
the
shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating
dividend
does
not
involve
a
security."
L.
Loss,
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 ( 1983) (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted).
6 It might be argued that this case,
involving the
transfer of 100% of the corporation's stock, is an easy
one in which to discern whether control has passed.
We
think even that assertion is open to some question under
the circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had
no intention of running the sawmill themselves and Ivan
Landreth apparently stayed on to manage the daily affairs
of the business.
The District Court was required to
undertake extensive fact-finding,
and even requested
supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control,
before it was able to decide the case. Petn App. 13a. If
this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how much
greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as
Gould v. Ruefenacht, ___ u.s. ___ (1985), decided today as

a companion to the case at bar, involving the sale of 50%
of a corporation's stock.
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Justice Stevens dissents on the ground that
Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the
federal security laws to apply to "the private sale of a
substantial ownership interest in a business where the
transactions is a sale of stock rather than of assets".
Justice Stevens, of course, is correct in saying that it
is clear from the legislative history of the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 that Congress was concerned
primarily with transactions "in securities • • • traded in
a public market".
Forman, 421

u.s.

See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
837, 849 (1975).

It also is true that

there is no indication in the legislative history that

2.

Congress considered the type of transactions involved in
this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra.
The history is simply silent - as it is with
respect to other transactions to which these Acts have
been applied by the Commission and judicial interpretation
over the half century since this legislation was adopted.
One only need mention the expansive interpretation of
§lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 adopted by the
Commission.

What the Court said in Blue Chip Stamps v.

Manor Drug Stores, 421

u.s.

723 (1975)

is relevant:

"When we deal with private actions under Rule
lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.
Such growth may be quite consistent with the
congressional enactment and with the role of the
federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I.
Case Co. v Borak, supra, but it would be
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1942 foreordained the present state of the
law with respect to Rule lOb-5.
It is therefor
proper that we consider in addition to the
factors already discussed, what may be described
as policy considerations when we come to flesh
out the portions of the law with respect to

3.

which neither the congressional enactment nor
the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance."
Id., at 723.

In this case, unlike the interpretation of
§10(b), we have the plain language §2(1) of the 1933 Act.
In addition, in Forman, supra, we recognized that the term
"stock" is to be read in accord with the common
understanding of its meaning, including the
characteristics identified in Forman.

Finally, as stated

in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is proper for a court to
consider - as we do today - "policy considerations" in
construing terms in these Acts.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1961
LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[April -

, 1985]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was fo1,1nd, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
Mter having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
Dennis agreed to purchase all of the common stock in the
lumber company. Ivan Landreth agreed to stay on as a con-
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sultant for some time to help with the daily operations of the
mill. Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Dennis and Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the equity, and six other investors together
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of
the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et
seq. (the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
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held corporation. ~Appk3a. Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 4 1 U. S. 837 (1975), and SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), the District Court
ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the transaction with the
anticipation of earning profits derived from the efforts of
others. Finding that managerial control of the business had
passed into the hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the
transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical
investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II

It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself;"
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979).
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a
"security" as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with stock as (i) the right to
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the ability to confer voting rights in proportion to
We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in § 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975).
1
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, the District
Court so found. ~ App. I 13a. Moreover, unlike in
. Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the
sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the context to
which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much more likely
here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was
covered by the federal securities laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that
Congress did not intend to provide a ~ federal remedy

-{io Pet. for ee,....t. J
.

L _

eov..u?Y'ene~s\v~

·'

83-1961-0PINION
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

6

-e.-(0"

for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556
(1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's
aP~~ definition of "security" to hold that the traditional
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 2 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way" to justify treating notes, bonds, and
other of the definitional categories differently. We address
these concerns in turn.
A
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp.,
for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold
interests in land near a proposed oil well drilling. In holding
that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court
noted that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." ~ at 351. Rather, it ruled that
unusual devices such as the leaseholds would also be covered

?

Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
~
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). SeeJjijeCP )!'; ;::
2

infra)
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"if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as
a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 }{. 8. 293 (194Ge further elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could be considered a "security" if the circumstances
of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an
offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a
contract for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting
the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning
of the 1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
:-11--___e_n_te-:-:-r..._p-:~rise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth3~ {l.S_j
ers." ~ at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the shares of
3
Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic
reality underlying the transactionl indicated that the mstru- -__,\,QU"-..,-.,..t.---;\----;m
;;::;-:::::
en~~ actually of a type that fa1ls within the usual concept
[ ·5
of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument
involved is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as there was in the prior
cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to
determine whether the Acts apply.
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. ...See pp. 19 28, iH:/'1 tg Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement.
See 455 U. S. 551, at 557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of
deposit involved in Weaver did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a security."
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." I d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac- r,
teristics bear out the label. See ~I 2 . ,
a..~X
Lti- 5(;)
Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our
cases are consistent with this view. 4 ffi~emfbiitmt:tl B1 othe1 _.e._

supra)

J--

• In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "s;}urity,"
respondents quote our statement in lnte1 lto:tional B1 otr'u1 haati
Teamsters v. Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security.'" 439
U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)).
We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We made
the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if
the instruments at issue were not "stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'"
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of our analysis of
whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived
"no distinction, for present purposes, between an 'investment contract' and
an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.'''" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the Howey test applied to any case
in which an instrument was alleged to be a security, but only that once the
label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyse the case
differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts"
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- ~os4 fJj Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey test to "determine whether a
particu~ financial arrangement constitutes an investment
cont;~c~{ United Housi
Foundation v. Forman, supra;
see
supra;> Moreover, applying the Howey test to
traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed
in the statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration
of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. AccordJ._
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2),
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 5
or as falling within another similarly general category of the definition-an
"instrument commonly known as a~ecurity.~ Under either of these general categories, the Howey test would apply.
5
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does

A

)
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We now turn to
concern that treating stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its characteristics
means that other categories listed in the statutory definition,
such as notes, must be treated the same way. Although we
do not decide whether coverage of notes or other instruments
may be provable by their name and characteristics, we do
point out several reasons why we think stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other categories listed in
the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
made
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we ~
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be=
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See
_
~ ~~~0-\--::s:::-:u-=p::::
ra-=-:11 }.. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional
\..____= _:/
stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that if "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. - - (1984), [1Q4
S Ct 297~ "note" may now be viewed as a relatively broad
term that encompasses instruments with widely varying
characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer
context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment
context. See id., at - lfi64 S. Ct., at 2986 2988] ~ We
here expressly leave until another day the question whether
"notes" or "bonds" or some other category of instrument
listed in the definition might be shown "by proving [only]
the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as
being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the
scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine de ends in each case on whether control has passed to
t e purchaser. U:rulet the doctr ine, the Acts' eoverage
WOUld have to ae determit:UHi QR a gase ay ease basis, depend•
ifig in part; Ofl the pereentage Gf stegk traH:sfcf'!'ed, the number of pm ehaset s, and what provisiofls for voting aH:d vetG
'f'ights were alse agreed apeH ay the parties. Thus, eoverage
by the Acts wotlld ifl most eases be Ufleel'taifl; it is pessible

P
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that un:tler some eil'eumstan:ces the same stodt eeald be
deemeel te be "secu:ritie~i" as to ilome parchasers, but n:et a:sto otl~:el's, el' a:s to the seHers, but n:ot the buj' et ~ We believe these uncertainties attendin the a lica · 't
he
Acts would be intolerable. 'Cf. arine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982)
ecting the argument that the
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage of control. 6 Accord
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982).

v
In sum, we conclude .that the stock at issue here is a "security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.

It might be argued that this case, involving the transfer of 100% of the
corporation's stock, is an easy one in which to discern whether control has
passed. We think even that assertion is open to some question under the
circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill themselves and Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to
manage the daily affairs of the business. The District Court was required
to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even requested supplemental facts
and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the
case. Pet. App. 13a. If this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how
much greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as Gould v.
Ruefenacht,- U. S . - (1985), decided today as a companion to the
case at bar, involving the sale of 50% of a corporation's stock.
6

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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Justice Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions ·Of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rehuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
Dennis agreed to purchase all of the common stock in the
lumber company. Ivan Landreth agreed to stay on as a con-
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sultant for some time to help with the daily operations of the
mill. Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Dennis and Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the equity, and six other investors together
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of
the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et
seq. (the 1934 Act).
·
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely

-.
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held corporation. ~ App ~13a. Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975), and SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), the District Court
ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security'' unless the purchaser had entered into the transaction with the
anticipation of earning profits derived from the efforts of
others. Finding that managerial control of the business had
passed into the hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the
transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical
investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II

It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord /'l'b~elna:titmal B1 oth-7 L
Brhaed ~ Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 lJ. S. 551, 558 (1979).
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a
"security" as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,

Pei. {Or Cerf-.J
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with stock as (i) the right to
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the ability to confer voting rights in proportion to
'We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975).
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, the District
Court so found. ~ App. J\f3a. Moreover, unlike m
Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the
sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the{context Eo
which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much more likely
here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was
covered by the federal securities laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that
Congress did not intend to provide a ~ federal remedy
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for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556
(1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 2 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled waJ( ~o justify treating notes, bonds, and
other of the definitional categories differently. We address
these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 83Q U. B. 344 (1943)a--for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold
interests in land near a proposed oil well drilling. In holding
that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court
noted that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." ~ at 351. Rather, it ruled that
unusual devices such as the leaseholds would also be covered
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L:
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See ~~· 86 B'i'o
2

infr~ 0..t
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"if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as
a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., ffi-92~8--+UJ.:-.~8~~~9~3+i(1~94~S~al!fiuiir:ti
t hweT"
r ei
elU:
u-:----tl?Trt{, J
cidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could be considered a "security" if the circumstances
of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an
offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a
contract for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting
the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning
of the 1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth71
L.__...---ers."
" -=-~
at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the shares of

J

3
Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic
reality underlying the transactio indicated that the instru~ 5 Wl~.l----m-e-n--:1fwattactually of a type that falls within the usual concept
of a ~curity. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument
involved is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as there was in the prior
cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to
determine whether the Acts apply.

Marif\e ~

v.

(A)(Av~r, sup~,

gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. 'See flfl· lQ ~. il-&fo:tQ' Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement.
See 466 ~ · S. 65~ at 557 n. 5, for an ex lanation of why the certificate of
deposit involved ·
1 not fit within the definition s category certificate of deposit, for a security."
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See1'f'· 9 1~ supra) ct..t lf- 5€)
Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our
cases are consistent with this view. 4 hete'f%8itte'l'hall1'Pethe'l"

6

• In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "s~urity,"
respondents quote our statement in ll~ttJJ national B1 othe1 hood=v Teamsters v. Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."' 439
U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)).
We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We made
the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if
the instruments at issue were not "stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'"
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of our analysis of
whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived
"no distinction, for present purposes, between an 'investment contract' and
an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the Howey test applied to any case
in which an instrument was alleged to be a security, but only that once the
label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyse the case
differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts"
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~Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey test to "determine whether a
particul financial arrangement constitutes an investment
contract"); United Housi Foundation v. Forman su ra·
see
supra Moreover, applying the Howey test to
traditional stoc.K and all other types of instruments listed
in the statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration
of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,(
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S. C. §77d(2),
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 5
or as falling within another similarly general category of the definition-an
"instrument commonly known as a.J.:;ecurity~ Under either of these general categories, the Howey test would apply.
6
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
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We now turn to ~ern that treating stock as a spe- +he (curt 4D ArftAls •5.
cific category of "security" provable by its characteristics
means that other categories listed in the statutory definition,
such as notes, must be treated the same way. Although we
do not decide whether coverage of notes or other instruments
may be provable by their name and characteristics, we do
point out several reasons why we think stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other categories listed in
the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See ~· le,e_
r-~-A.-J--a.-t~if'-~5.......,{--:0 su_p_r_a,~ Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional
_
. stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though

[

not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. - - (1984), i194
~. Ct. 2S~"note" may now be viewed as a relatively broad
term that encompasses instruments with widely varying
characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer
context, as commercial pa~er or. in.~ome o.t.her investment
context. See id., at
~.
at l9~8 2g~~ We
here expressly leave until another day the question whether
"notes" or "bonds" or some other category of instrument
listed in the definition might be shown "by proving [only]
the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as
being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the
scope of the Acts' definition of "security."

J\fi64 et,

IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed to
e pure aser. Yaae:P --tR.e aeet:riHe, the Aets' eo verage
..weN.la have te he deteriniHea eH a: ea3e•h, =ea3e ha3i3, depend•
i:Ag i:A ~~ ea tR.e l"e:reentage ef steele t:ra:HsfeHea, tR.e Hl:lffi
BeF of pm:chasers, a:Ad m}:}at; tm:pri~;iQ:Ai tQr lT9ti:ag aaa veta
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that undet some ch cumstance~ tae

~ftme

13

stock could be

..Qeemeel te ee "~ecut ttles" as to S011Ie pUI chasers, '9-at Ret as

-tg g(b~ri , or ai to tbi sellePB, lin~t Bet tae al::lyei"i We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability of the
Acts would be intolerable. @ Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage of control..P- Accord)
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982).

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.

6
It might be argued that this case, involving the transfer of 100% of the
corporation's stock, is an easy one in which to discern whether control has
passed. We think even that assertion is open to some question under the
circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill themselves and Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to
manage the daily affairs of the business. The District Court was required
to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even requested supplemental facts
and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the
case. Pet. App. 13a. If this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how
much greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as GCYUld v.
Ruefenacht,- U. S. (1985), decided today as a companion to the
case at bar, involving the sale of 50% of a corporation's stock.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1961
LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
IVAN K. LANDRETH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[April -

, 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
./
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
Dennis"'agreed to purchase all of the common stock in the
lumber company. Ivan Landreth agreed to stay on as a con-

.
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sultant for some time to help with the daily operations of the
mill. Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Dennis and Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the equity, and six other investors together
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of
the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et
seq. (the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
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held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II

It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a "security" as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identifi~d those characteristics usually associated with ock as (i) the right to
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the ~y to confer voting rights in proportion to
1
We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975).

'
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, the District
Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved
here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the kind
of context to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much
more likely here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. Under
the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that
Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal

~

'

0

83-1961-0PINION
6

LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

remedy for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551,
556 (1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 2 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., supra, for example, the Court considered whether the
1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near
a proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such
2
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
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as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the shares of
3
Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic
reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly within the
statutory definition. There is no need here, as there was in
the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a security."

~---~
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey~ test was designed
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our
cases are consistent with this view. 4 Teamsters v. Daniel,
• In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel that the Howey
test "'embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's
decisions defining a security.'" 439 U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)). We do not read this bit of dicta as
broadly as respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not
"stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security' " within the statutory definition.
We stated, as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes,
between an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a
"security.""' 421 U.S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say
that the Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged
to be a security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we
perceived no reason to analyse the case differently whether we viewed the
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly

?..
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439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey
test to "determine whether a particular financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, supra; see supra, at 7. Moreover,
applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other
types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would
make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2
1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2),
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 5
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security.' " Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.
5
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security.'' L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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B

We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,

"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially

'
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a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized JoineYs
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics,
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at - - . We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV

We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed to
the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
ofacorporation'sstock~y"transferscontrol. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so

~
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may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984); Seldin, When Stock
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case,
the District Court was required to undertake extensive factfinding, and even requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the
case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, - - U. S. - - , - (1985), decided today as a companion to this case, coverage
by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable
to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts
would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until
.they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept s o t~lusive as the passage of control. Accord,
Golden v. GaraJalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982).
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v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1985]

JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
Dennis ftgt eed to pm chas« all of the common stock in the
lumber company. I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a con-
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sultant for some time to help with the dail o erations of the
mil . Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Com an . Dennis and Bolten
a o petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the equity, and six other investors together
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of
the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a, et seq. , (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et
seq. (the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
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held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II

It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a "security" as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,

'
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securiacties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified tho
teristics usually associated with stock as (i) the right to
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be led ed or h othecated; (iv) the ability tE&-confer votm ights in proportion to
1
We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in § 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975).

'
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value.~ Id., at 851.
Under the acts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with stock. n ee , the 1strict
Court so found. App. to Pet. or Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved
here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the kind
of~t9Kj to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much
more likely here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. Under
the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that
Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal
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remedy for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551,
556 (1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner.J\ Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp. , supra, for example, the Court considered whether the
1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near
a proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such

~---zProfessor

Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
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as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based~ require us to reject the view that the shares of

\ u/----ARespondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
V
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." [Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic
reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly within the
statutory definition. There is no need here, as there was in
the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a security."
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, 4-5.
~~----~~--~----/
Second, we would note that the H oweyA"test was designed
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our
\ S/
cases are consistent with this view.)\ Teamsters v. Daniel,
\/'
----z ln support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Jlowey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel that the Howey
test "'embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's
decisions defining a security."' 439 U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)). We do not read this bit of dicta as
broadly as respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not
"stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition.
We stated, as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes,
between an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a
"security."'" 421 U.S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say
that the Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged
to be a security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we
perceived no reason to analyse the case differently whether we viewed the
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
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439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey
test to "determine whether a particular financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, supra; see supra, at 7. Moreover,
applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other
types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would
make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2
1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act,§§ 14, 16, 15 U.S. C. §§78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2),
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re~
fute respondents' position{
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security." ' Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
\ b /.
would apply.
\/ --.,~In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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B

We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially

83-1961-0PINION
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a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics,
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at--. We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed to
the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock f,WesY~ptivel~ transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
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may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984); Seldin, When Stock
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case,
the District Court was required to undertake extensive factfinding, and even requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the
case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, - - U. S. - - , - (1985), decided today as a companion to this case, coverage
by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable
to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts
would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage of control. Accord,
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982).
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v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.
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JUSTICE POWELL~ the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company.
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stockhe purchased to B & D Co an a corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the umber company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company,
forming petitioner Landreth Timber C ~ an . Dennis and
Bolten then acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the equity, and six other investors together
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of
the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
~ } § 77ao et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a0 et l.J$
seq. (the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It aclmowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing

I
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majority'' of courts that had held that the federal securities
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. v Relying on
United;.- Housing Foundation/\. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946) /
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security'' unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). "" It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. --:;.:;::_-- U. S. - - (1984). We t./6'1/
now reverse.
II
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
SH STY
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." '~"
MA U:,t
I
2
• - O,Z..
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975f'(PoWELL, J., concurrinJ); accord, Teamsters v. Da~
n
..J,
iel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
?~ 7~(Ld.~d.
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a "security" as including
~-- L.t<
~
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust

rP,....:...
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or ri?'ht to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1

~Inc·

1-

As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), "'
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation,_v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. v
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"som~ of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851,' recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser just~bly [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850.1 We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of

@
rn,;

1
We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in§ 3(a)(10) "'
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) ~f the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
/
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 5551\n. 3 (1982{ United Housing 1
Foundation/\v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 84~n. 12 (1975). "
')I~

c;__f.
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring votin o rights in proportion to the number of shares owne ; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. (
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. v
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. ,. . . Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of
the kind of •m~r 1iie.lto which the Acts normally apply. It
is thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was covered by the federal securities
laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be
treated as "securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress'4 remedial purpose in en- liP? {
2
Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock,
the kind of stock ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and
still be covered by the Acts.
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security.'" ""'SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S. ~J 299 fl-94~ (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1stSess ..All (1933)): Although we recognize that
Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal
remedy for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551,
556 (1982); we think it would improperly narrow Congress'f Mt /
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to~old this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, io justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983)." See infra, at
11-12.
3
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., su ra for example, the Court considered whether the
1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near
a proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." v
320 U. S., at 351.,. . Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' " Ibid. "'
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security'' if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." " 328 U. S., at 301:'
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their

'

'
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. -:;
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." See n@ 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been

f/

• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knigh~ 389 U. S. 332 (1967)/
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their argument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 55~ n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of
deposit, for a security." '
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." v' I d., at 355. "' Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality
test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Team5

In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Danie~?at the Howey -1- '13 7 1/. 5. S tJ /.)55'~,.. /(/f7
test "'embodies the essential attributes that run U1r~ all of the Court's
decisions defining a securit)l "' "@911. S. 55'r,~f~ (quoting
Forman, 421 U. S. @ 852 ft975)). We do not reaa this oro·f dicta as
:::J
broadly as respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not
"stock'' and were not ''investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition.

)1,/ ;;f.J
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sters v. Daniel, 439 u. s@ 558 {t979) (appropriate to turn 1" oVt l1h
to the Howey test to "detennine whether a particular finan:,te/t;/ltns/n{' cial @ angemenb constitutes an investment contract");
{
)
7
/).Inc. .; United Housing Foundatio~v. Forman, ~ see supra, 1/:J- 1 fl,f. 8' :3
1tf75
) at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test t~tional stock
and all other types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139,
1144 (CA2 1982{ See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332,
343 (1967) ../
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g. , 1934 Act,§§ 14, 16,'15 U.S. C. §§78n, 78p/
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan , 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983) ..; Furthermore, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S. C. §77d(2), v
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud

.

,

J

We stated, as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes,
between an 'investment contract' .~d an 'instrument commonly known as a
"security.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say
that the Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged
to be a security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we
perceived no reason to analyfe the case differently whether we viewed the. 'Z.
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.

Q
:.if'?

~
1
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6
B

We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. v Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an ''investment contract" to tradi1
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." "' L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

v

'

0
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983)( As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." • I d., at 212 v
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943),vthe Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. 1 Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850 . .; As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,~ U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics,
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at--. We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." 1 SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355."' We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing ·
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed to
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrin 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984)( Seldin, When Stock
is Not a Security; 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case,
the District Court was required to un ertake extensive actfinding, and even requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the
case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. v
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht,
U. S. - - , --=3)
, decided today as a companion to this case, coverage
by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable
to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts
would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. @ 559An. 9 ~(rejecting the argument that the
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security'' once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase

E--
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the workload of the federal courts by converting state and
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage of contr~~
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d ®
1145-1146
0t§J

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.
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LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumbe_r company.
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company
stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 7~a et seq.
(the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II

It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C.
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust

83-1961-0PINION
4

LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
'We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975).
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of
the kind of context to which the Acts normally appl;Y. It is
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en2

Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock,
the kind of stock ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and
still be covered by the Acts.
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad de~ition
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here
falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
3
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
cases require us in every case to look to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character:..
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their argument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of
deposit, for a security."

83-1961-0PINION
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH

9

because the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security'' simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality
test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 TeamIn support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551,
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting
Forman, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as
respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated,
5
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sters v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the
statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of
many types of instruments superfluous.
Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the.. transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S. C. '§77d(2),
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "security."'" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6
B
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditioNal stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi6
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. A.s we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at - - . We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed to
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities LawsfW7~~7=---- ')
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District c6\n-t
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at - - , decided
today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9
(rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue

-·
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there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security"
once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal
courts by converting state and common law fraud claims into
federal claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction may never know whether
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended
discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the
passage of control. Accord, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d-)
1145-1146.

v

In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.
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2nd draft
Justice Stevens dissents on the ground that
Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the
federal security laws to apply to "the private sale of a
substantial ownership interest in a business where the
transactions is a sale of stock rather than of assets".
Justice Stevens, of course, is correct in saying that it
is clear from the legislative history of the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 that Congress was concerned
primarily with transactions "in securities • • . traded in
a public market".
Forman, 421

u.s.

See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
837, 849 (1975).

It also is true that

there is no indication in the legislative history that

2.

Congress considered the type of transactions involved in
this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra.
The history is simply silent - as it is with
respect to other transactions to which these Acts have
been applied by the Commission and judicial interpretation
over the half century since this legislation was adopted.
One only need mention the expansive interpretation of
§lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 adopted by the
Commission.

What the Court said in Blue Chip Stamps v.

Manor Drug Stores, 421

u.s.

723 (1975)

is relevant:

"When we deal with private actions under Rule
lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.
Such growth may be quite consistent with the
congressional enactment and with the role of the
federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I.
Case Co. v Borak, supra, but it would be
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1942 foreordained the present state of the
law with respect to Rule lOb-5.
It is therefor
proper that we consider in addition to the
factors already discussed, what may be described
as policy considerations when we come to flesh
out the portions of the law with respect to

3.

which neither the congressional enactment nor
the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance."
Id., at 723.

In this case, unlike the interpretation of
§lO(b), we have the plain language §2(1) of the 1933 Act.
In addition, in Forman, supra, we recognized that the term
"stock" is to be read in accord with the common
understanding of its meaning, including the
characteristics identified in Forman.

Finally, as stated

in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is proper for a court to
consider - as we do today - "policy considerations" in
construing terms in these Acts.

Lynda:
target.

Your language in Blue Chip Stamps is right on

~,to ~r?~-This would be ad ~ed - probably at the end of our

1\

4.

opinion - as a footnote.

Feel free to improve both the

language and the substance of the foregoing.

If any

further cites- e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progenyseem relevant, you might add them.
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LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
IVAN K. LANDRETH ET AL.
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[May-, 1985]
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company.
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company
stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 7~a et seq.
(the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
·case whether the. economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C.
§ 77b(1), defines a "security" as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust

.
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
. . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the fot:egoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
'We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in§ 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975).
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of
the kind of context to which the Acts normally applr. It is
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in enAlthough we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock,
e
o stoc
· at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and
still be covered by the Acts.
2
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here
falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
3
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a. contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
their name and characteristics. Instead the ar e that our
cases require us in every
to ook to the economic su stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control.
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur,
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been
4

Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their argument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of
deposit, for a security."

'
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of.the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." /d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality
test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Team5
In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551,
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security"' (quoting
Forman, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as
respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated,

'
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sters v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the
statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of
Golden v.
many types of instruments superfluous.
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act 15 U.S. C. ·§77d(2),
exempts ~rivat, transactions from the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the instruments as ''investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
general category of the definition-an ''instrument commonly known as a
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.

'
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6
B

We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for detennining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi6
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at - -. We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
By respondents' own admission, application of the docdepends in each case on whether control has passed to

'
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
" ..'-~ AL.lJ.
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is~ a passive invest~"~ r---y
tor not engaged in the daily management- of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws; 37
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District Court
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
woul inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
e cts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also~such factors as @
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at - - , decided
today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts
would in most cases be unknown and unknowab~o the parties at the time the stock was sold. We eeiieve hese unce
tainties attending the applicability of the Acts would ~llii~~~~ee:~=~Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9
(rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue
~.._..-~...

'
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there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security"
once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal
courts by converting state and common law fraud claims into
federal claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction may never know whether
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended
discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the
passage of control. Accord, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d
1145-1146.

v

In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.
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.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a compa.ny is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company.
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation
. formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company
~tock. . B & D then.merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq.
(the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
. the District Court ruled that the stock could not be conside,red a ."security"'.unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits . derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. - - (1984): We
now reverse.
II
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C.
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including
·
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share; investment contract, voting-trust
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, .gas, or other mineral rights,
... or, in general, any'interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, '421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975).
1
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, ·we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean. ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock e~titling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of
the kind of context to which the Acts normally apply. It is
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in enAlthough we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock,
the kind of stock often at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and
still be covered by the Acts.
2
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to tpe issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security.'" SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. ,
. 328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 11 (1933)) . .. Although we recognize that Congress did
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here
falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
8
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in. terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
t.he Act does not'.stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their

'
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
. their name and characteristics. · Instead, they argue that our
c.ases require us ·in .every instance t~ look to the ec.onomic
substance of the transactiOn to determme whether the Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of
others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased
just as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus,
respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to. understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their argument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of
deposit, for a security."

I
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality
test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Teamsters
5
In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551,
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting
Forman, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as
respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated,
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v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the
· statutory definition .would make the Acts' enumeration of
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v., Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2),
exempts transactions not involving any public offering from
the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exas part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.."'" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a
security, but only that once the label "stock" did ·not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the instruments as ''investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.

'
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emption from the antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure
and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6
B

We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
· characteristics m~ans that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated th~ same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage -of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi6
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,

"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though
his· signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at - - . We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
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case. 7 By respondents' own admission, application of the
doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed
to the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
JUSTICE STEVENS dissents on the ·ground that Congress did not intend
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to "the
private sale of a substantial ownership interest in [a business] simply be. cause the transaction[] w[as] structured as [a] sale[] of stock instead of assets." P.ost, at 4. juSTICE STEVENS, of course, is correct in saying that
it is clear from the legislative history of the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 that Congress was concerned primarily with transactions "in securities ... traded in a public market." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered the type of transactions involved in this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra.
The history is simply silent-as it is with respect to other transactions to
which these Acts have been applied by the Commission and judicial interpretation over the half century since this legislation was adopted. One
only need mention the expansive interpretation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Commission. What the Court said in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975), is relevant:
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such
growth may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with
the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. Case Co. v
Borak, [377 U. S. 426 (1964)], but it would be disingenuous to suggest that
either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in
1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.
It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come
to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance." Id., at 737.
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196-197 (1976).
In this case, unlike with respect to the interpretation of§ 10(b) in Blue
Chip Stamps, we have the plain language of § 2(1) of the 1933 Act in support of our interpretation. In Forman, supra, we recognized that the
term "stock" is to be read in accordance with the common understanding of
its meaning, including the characteristics identified in Forman. See
supra, at 4-5. In addition, as stated in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is
proper for a court to consider-as we do today-policy considerations in
construing terms in these Acts.
7

..
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case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of'a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
. support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is simply a passive investor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws; 37
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District Court
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
inevitably would lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also on such factors
as the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting
and veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at - - , decided today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to th~ parties at the time the stock was sold. These uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would hardly be in the
best interests of either party to a transaction. Cf. Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 (rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue there was trans-

I
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formed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was
pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal courts by
converting state and common law fraud claims into federal
claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that
parties to a transaction may never know whether they are
covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery
. and litigation over-a concept as often elusive as the passage ·of
controL Accord,· G"olden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1145.- 1146.

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the
Acts).
I
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill
would be completely rebuilt and modernized.
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the predicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer.
Mter having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted,
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company. .

'
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as .a consultant for some
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant
to the terms of the stock ·purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation
. formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company
~tock. . B & D then .'merged with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity.
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents
had widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts as to the
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq.
(the 1934 Act).
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts.
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cer.t. 13a. Relying on
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946),
. the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid~red a ."security"·.unless the purchaser had entered into the
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers,
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of business doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts ·of Appeals
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
II
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C.
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, vo~ing-trust
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
. . . or, in general, any·interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary·or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982),
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry wellsettled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable
character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850.
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that
we must also determine whether those instruments possess
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics,
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
1
We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in§ 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975).
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851.
Under the facts of Forman, 'we concluded that the instruments at issue there were not "securities" within the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics
listed above that are usually associated with traditional
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the federal securities laws governed their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of
the kind of context to which the Acts normally apply. It is
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts.
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en2
Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock,
the kind of stock often at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and
still be covered by the Acts.

I
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full
and fair disclosure relative to tpe issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our 'commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security.'" SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
-328 U. $.,at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 11 (1933)). ·_ Although we recognize that Congress did
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here
falls outside the Acts' coverage.

III
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however,
that language in our previous opinion~, including Forman,
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and .the
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories
differently. We address these concerns in turn.
A

It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a "security." This Court has decided a number
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
3
Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L.
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at
11-12.
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in. terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of
t.he Act does nof .stop with the obvious and commonplace."
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devic'es such
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under ·
terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the
transaction "involve[d) an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to address the argument that the instruments were "investment
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858.
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of
. their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our
c.ases require us ·in .every instance to look to the economic
substance of the transaction to determine whether the 'Howey
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of
others, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased
just as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus,
respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967),
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their argument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts.
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of
deposit, for a security."

J
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943),
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act;
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts'
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5.
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality
test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Teamsters
5
In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security,"
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551,
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting
F01'1rULn, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as
respondents do. We made the statement in F01'1rULn in reference to the
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security' " within the statutory definition. We stated,
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v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Fo_'f"m!1n, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the
· statutory definition .would make the Acts' enumeration of
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v., Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967).
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders,
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p.
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments involved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Furthermore, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2),
exempts transactions not involving any public offering from
the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable exas part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test
would apply.
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emption from the antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure
and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6
B

We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its
characteristics m~ans that other categories listed in the statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated th~ same
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage -of notes
or other instruments may be provable by their name and
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other
categories listed in the Acts' definition.
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi6
In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does
not involve a security." · L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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tiona! stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains,

"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing
his credit card _slip is not selling a security even though
his· signature is ~m 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially
a security as to foreclose further analysis." Id., at 212
(emphasis in original).
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds"
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d.,
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently suggested in a different context in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. - - (1984), "note"
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. See
id., at - - . We here expressly leave until another day the
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock"
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security."
IV

We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this
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case. 7 By respondents' own admission, application of the
doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed
to the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this
7

JUSTICE STEVENS dissents on the ground that Congress did not intend
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to "the
private sale of a substantial ownership interest in [a business] simply because the transaction[] w[as] structured as [a] sale[] of stock instead of ass.ets." Post, at 4. jusTICE STEVENS, of course, is correct in saying that
it is clear from the legislative history of the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 that Congress was concerned primarily with transactions "in securities ... traded in a public market." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered the type of transactions involved in this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra.
The history is simply silent-as it is with respect to other transactions to
which these Acts have been applied by the Commission and judicial interpretation over the half century since this legislation was adopted. One
only need mention the expansive interpretation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Commission. What the Court said in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975), is relevant:
"When we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such
growth may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with
the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. Case Co. v
Borak, [377 U. S. 426 (1964)], but it would be disingenuous to suggest that
either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in
1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.
It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come
to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance." !d., at 737.
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196-197 (1976).
In this case, unlike with respect to the interpretation of§ 10(b) in Blue
Chip Stamps, we have the plain language of§ 2(1) of the 1933 Act in support of our interpretation. In Forman, supra, we recognized that the
term "stock" is to be read in accordance with the common understanding of
its meaning, including the characteristics identified in Forman. See
supra, at 4-5. In addition, as stated in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is
proper for a court to consider-as we do today-policy considerations in
construing terms in these Acts.
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case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We
think even that assertion is open to some question, however,
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who
. support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is simply a passive in- \
vestor not engaged in the daily management of the business.
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws; 37
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District Court
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 13a.
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This
inevitably would lead to difficult questions of line-drawing.
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on
the percentage of stock transferred, but also on such factors
as the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting
and veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at - - , decided today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the par. ties at the time the stock was sold. These uncertainties at- ~
tending the applicability of the Acts would hardly be in the
best interests of either party to a transaction. Cf. Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 (rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue there was trans-
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fonned, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was
pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal courts by
converting state and common law fraud claims into federal
claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that
parties to a transaction may never know whether they are
covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery
·.and litigation over-a concept as often elusive as the passage of
controL Accord, Oolden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1145-1146.

v
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
.therefore
Reversed.
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Respondents father and sons, who owned all of the common stock of a
lumber business that they operated, offered their stock for sale through
brokers. The company's sawmjll was subsequently damaged by fire,
but potential purchasers were told that the mill would be rebuilt and
modernized. Thereafter, a stock purchase agreement for all of the stock
was executed, and ultimately petitioner company was formed by the purchasers. Respondent father agreed to stay on as a consultant for some
time to help with the daily opera'tion of the mill. After the acquisition
was completed, the mill did not live up to the purchasers' expectations.
Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership.
Petitioner then filed suit in Federal District Court for rescission of the
sale of stock and damages, alleging that respondents had violated the
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court
granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that under the
"sale of business" doctrine, the stock could not be considered a "security''
for purposes of the Acts because managerial control of the business had
passed into the hands of the purchasers, who bought 100% of the stock.
The court concluded that the transaction thus was a commercial venture
rather than a typical investment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The stock at issue here is a "security'' within the definition of
the Acts, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837,
distinguished, and the "sale of business" doctrine does not apply.
Pp. 3-14.
(a) Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act defines a "security" as including
"stock" and other listed types of instruments. Although the fact that
instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the
Acts' coverage, when an instrument is both called "stock" and bears
I
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stock's usual characteristics as identified in Forman, supra, a purchaser
justifiably may assume that the federal securities laws apply. The stock
involved here possesses all of the characteristics traditionally associated
with common stock. Moreover, reading the securities laws to apply to
the sale of stock at issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose
in enacting the legislation to protect investors. Pp. 3-6.
(b) When an instrument is labeled "stock" and possesses all of the traditional characteristics of stock, a court is not required to look to the
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the stock is
a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. A contrary rule is not supported by this Court's prior decisions involving unusual instruments not
easily characterized as "securities." Nor were the Acts intended, as
asserted by respondents, to cover only "passive investors" and not privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of control to "entrepreneurs." Pp. 6-11.
(c) An instrument bearing both the name and all of the usual characteristics of stock presents the clearest case for coverage by the plain
language of the definition. "Stock" is distinguishable from most if not
all of the other listed categories, and may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the Acts' definition of "security." Pp. 11-12.
(d) Application of the "sale of business" doctrine depends on whether
control has passed to the purchaser. Even though the transfer of 100%
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control, the purchasers here
had no intention of running the sawmill themselves. Moreover, if the
doctrine were applied here, it would also have to be applied to cases in
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold, thus inevitably leading to difficult questions of line-drawing. As explained in Gould v.
Ruefenacht, post, p. - - , coverage by the Acts would in most -cases be
unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold.
Such uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intolerable. Pp. 12-14.
731 F. 2d 1348, reversed,
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

